Capitalism and political power

Krzysztof Waśniewski

Uzyskaj dostęp

Zakup książkę

ISBN/ISSN:

978-83-7383-882-6

DOI:

Wydawnictwo:

Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar

Rok wydania:

2017

Liczba stron:

216

XML:ISBN/ISSN:

ONIX MARC21

Bibliografia:

Waśniewski, Krzysztof. Capitalism and political power. Red. . Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2017, 216 s. ISBN 978-83-7383-882-6

Bibliografia refWorks:

RT Book, Whole

SR Electronic(1)

A1 Waśniewski, K.

T1 Capitalism and political power

PB Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar

PP Warszawa

YR 2017

SN 978-83-7383-882-6

Bibliografia BibTex:

@Book{ 193060, author = "Waśniewski, Krzysztof", editor = "", title = "Capitalism and political power", publisher = "Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar", year = "2017", address = "Warszawa", isbn = "978-83-7383-882-6" }

Bibliografia endNote:

TY - BOOK

AU - Waśniewski, Krzysztof

ED -

TI - Capitalism and political power

PB - Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar

CY - Warszawa

PY - 2017

SN - 978-83-7383-882-6

ER -

Netografia (standard APA):

Waśniewski, Krzysztof. Capitalism and political power [baza danych online] Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2017 [dostęp: 28 04 2024]. Dostęp w Ibuk Libra: https://libra.ibuk.pl/reader/capitalism-and-political-power-krzysztof-wasniewski-193060.

"Capitalism and Political Power" presents the author’s research spanning economics, law and politics. Its central idea is that governments need two components to consolidate their position: legitimation and economic power. Legitimation is co...

Więcej

ISBN/ISSN:

978-83-7383-882-6

DOI:

Wydawnictwo:

Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar

Rok wydania:

2017

Liczba stron:

216

XML:ISBN/ISSN:

ONIX MARC21

ContentsIntroduction7
Chapter 1. The constitutional state as a functional technology11
and Max Weber15
1.2. Fernand Braudel and the “set of sets” theory19
1.3. Jurgen Habermas and discursive politics22
1.4. The utilitarian view of the state25
1.5. Thomas Malthus and the demographic factor28
1.6. The theory of social contract: Rousseau and Rawls30
1.7. Herbert Hart’s theory of law33
1.8. The division of powers in political systems35
1.9. Attempt at the classification of political systems38
1.10. The economic role of political institutionsand Barry Weingast’s theory40
relations45
1.12. Changes in international law49
1.13. Migrations53
1.14. International aid as an aspect of international relations55
1.15. Investor-state disputes and international law61
1.16. A tentative conclusion: political systems seen as technologieswith a lifecycle based on efficiency73
Chapter 2. The fiscal function of constitutional states90
2.1. The main fiscal trends observable in the sample of 77 countries96
2.2. Bank lending, private debt and public debt102
2.3. The general issue of public debt103
2.4. Types and clusters of political systems in the sampleof 77 countries118
2.5. Fiscal stances typical for political systems121
2.6. Conclusion – the institutional foundations of capital appropriationin political systems133
Chapter 3. Changes in the ways that capitalism works137
3.1. Environmental challenges138
economy146
3.3. The velocity of money149
3.4. The velocity of money and financial markets159
3.5. National case studies167
3.5.1. United States169
3.5.2. Bolivia171
3.5.3. New Zealand175
3.5.4. Mexico181
3.5.5. Israel184
Concluding remarks187
Bibliography199
Index of names210
List of Tables213
List of Figures214

Chapter1.Teconstitutionalstateasafunctionaltechnology

ofporkleadstoadecreaseinprices,which,inturn,createsanincentive

toreducethenumberofpigs.Asmallerlivestockpopulationleadstolow-

ersupplyandhigherprices,whichagaininducesfarmerstoexpandtheir

livestock,etc.Whilstthephenomenoniscolloquiallydubbeduthepork

cycle”

,itreferstoanyﬁeldofagriculturewhereproducerscanmoreor

lessﬂexiblyadaptthevolumeofproductiontochangingprices.Wehave

hereacomplexcycleofsocialchangesinthefarmingbusinessrevolving

aroundthenaturalcycleofgrowthinanimalsorplants.Interestingly,

theshorterthatnaturalcycle(i.e.theshorterthetimerequiredtoef-

cientlyadapttothechangingprices),themorelikelytheeconomiccycle

istooccur.Insomeﬁeldsofagriculture,though,wherethenaturalcycle

ofgrowthissomehowtoolong,theuporkcycle”isnotreallyobservable.

Productionofwineandthecultivationofvineyardsisagoodexample.

Grapesgrownforwineneedmanyyearsbeforetheyreachsufcientma-

turity,andalotofcostlyexperimentationisrequiredbeforethevineyard

startstoyieldapredictabletaste.Evenifpricesfall,producerswould

ratherstockpiletheirwinethanreducetheacreageofvineyards.Abio-

logicalcyclethatistoolongmakestheuporkcycle”adaptationtoocostly

andtoorisky.

Tus,whenthecycleofadaptationisrelativelyshortandpredictable,

manysocialchangesgooninaloop,withoutanyclearultimatepur-

pose.Politicsworksverymuchlikeporkfarming.Whencapitalischeap

andaccessible,i.e.wheninterestratesarelow,governmentsborrowea-

gerlyandaccumulatesigniﬁcantgrossdebtevenwithoutclearnecessi-

ty.Wheninterestratesgoupandindebtednessstartstoweighheavily

onthepublicpocket,budgetarydeﬁcitsarecutanddebtaccumulatesat

aslowerrate,orevendecreases.Tatleadstotheparadoxofcounter-ef-

cientﬁscalpolicies,overlylaxinthetimesofplentyandunnecessarilyre-

strictiveinthetimesofscarcity.Althoughtheloopofadaptationisclear,

noultimatepurposecanbeascribedtoit.Itisprobablyoneofthegreat-

estmeritsofeconomicsciencestohaveshownthat,mostofthetime,

economicsystemsoscillateinasetofproximateincentivesratherthan

evolvetowardsomeultimatepurpose.

Terearetwotheoreticalreasonsfortheauthortoavoid,inthisbook,

theevolutionistdistinctionbetweenproximateandultimatecauses.First-

ly,weneveractuallyknowwhetherthecurrentlydiscoveredlinkbetween

phenomenaistheultimateone.Somethingthatwemaycurrentlyper-

ceiveastheultimatepurposeofsomebehaviourmightbesubordinateto

anevenmoreoverarchingonethatwehavenotgraspedyet.Tatleadsto

Brak wyników

Capitalism and political power

Treść książki

Znajdź bibliotekę blisko siebie, i uzyskaj dostęp do ebooka w systemie IBUK Libra