Treść książki
Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
TheQualityofDemocracy
31
argumentsarefirstandforemostconcernedwithwhethertheUnion’sconditionsare
therightonesandwithwhetherithasanyrighttoinsistuponthematall.Letme
summarise,then,whateachofthefourchaptershastotellusaboutthestrengths,
weaknessesandunintendedconsequencesofdemocratisationunderthetutelageof
externallyassessedcriteria.
GrzegorzEkiertnotesthata"standardcritique”oftheEU’sattemptstopromote
democracyinCentralandEasternEuroperunsasfollows.TheEUhas"exportedits
democraticdeficit”totheregion.Itsconditionalityhasrestrictedpoliticalchoices
anddebates.Ithasfavouredstatusquoelitesagainstpoliticalcompetition,excluding
somemorepopularactorswhohaverespondedbyturningthemselvesintopopulists.
Theoverallresulthasbeenamissedopportunitytocreate"fullylegitimateandpar-
ticipatorydemocraciesintheregion”.Yet,Ekiertargues,thestandardcritiquehas
been"poorlyspecifiedandinadequatelyinvestigated”.Inhisview,wecanonlyre-
allyidentifyshortcomingsthatcanbeattributedtotheUnion’sconditionalityifwe
firstidentifyproblemswhichwouldprobablyhaveexisted,quiteregardlessofany
democraticconditionalityadministeredbytheUnion.Hethensuggestsfivesuchdi-
lemmas.Letmehighlightthosedilemmashelinkstotheneedfornewmemberstates
toadoptamassiveacquiscommunautaire.Thismeansthatformanyyearsbefore,
duringandafteraccession,theproportionofnewpolicyandlawforwhichnational
democraticinstitutionscanmeaningfullybeheldaccountable–inthesensethatithas
beenfreelychosenbythoseinstitutions–islow.Indeed,theadoptionoftheacquis
ismainlyamatterofexecutionandadministration,notofchoice.Thusanytendency
forEuropeanintegrationtostrengthenexecutiveactorswithinmemberstatesatthe
expenseofpublics,parliaments,partiesandoppositionsislikelytobeespecially
acuteduringtheearlyphaseofUnionmembership.
WhilstEkiertfocusesonstructuraldilemmas,NicoleGallinaconcentratesmore
ontheroleofelitebehaviourinconstrainingwhattheUnion’sdemocraticcondi-
tionalityhasbeenabletoachieveinCentralandEasternEurope.Shedevelopsthe
ingeniousargumentthattheUnion’sdemocraticconditionalityprescribes"struc-
tures”whicharenotaltogethercompatiblewithlocalformsof"agency”.TheUnion
prescribesaconstitutionalistapproachtotheformaldesignofdemocraticinstitu-
tionswhichpresupposes"consensual”elites.Yet,inthecaseofCentralandEastern
Europe,someeliteshavebeenrivenanddrivenbyhistoricalconflicts.Othershave
easilybeentemptedbytheopportunitiesforpopulistmobilisationsofferedbycrises,
imperfectlyconsolidatedpartysystems,andtheenvelopmentofmainstreamelites
inanincreasinglymanagerialapproachtopolitics.Thusinstitutionswhichrequire
"cooperation”includeactors–andsometimeswholegovernments–whichbehavein
"confrontational”and"non-transparent”ways.
DarinaMalováandBranislavDolnýalsoaskwhethertheaccessionprocesshas
promotedorconstraineddemocracyinthenewmemberstates.TheyarguethattheEU
has"promotedinstitutionsstabilisingthehorizontaldivisionofpowers,ruleoflaw,
humanandminorityrightsprotection(...)howeverthetechnocraticaccessionlogic
neglectedthenormsandrulesofparticipatoryand/orpopulardemocracy”(PAGES).
TheUnion’sdemocraticconditionalityhasbeenunabletoensurethebuildingof