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I.Poland’sForeignPolicyBefore1989
tionleftitinaparticularlyunfavourablesituationfromthispointofview.Poland
wasthecorridorbywhichtheGermanDemocraticRepublicwasaccessed.Ifthe
said"IronCurtain”wastobekeptinplacealongtheElbe,therewouldneedtobe
backupfacilitiesoffering"strategicdepth”notfarbehinditandthatmeantPoland.
Moscowpersistedwithapolicydemandingabsolutereliabilityonthepartofthat
hinterlandregion.Indeed,whenthetwoblocsEasternandWesterncameintoexist-
ence,Polandwasthehostageconferringthebalancetheverystabilityuponthe
wholesystem.Thus,bothMoscowanditsacolytesinWarsawmadeitabundantly
clearthatanychangewhatsoeverinPoland,sstatusthreatenedall-outwar.
Poland,smakeoverintoaSovietsatellitestateproceededalonginternaland
externallinessimultaneously.ThefalsicationoftheJanuary1947election/ref-
erendumresultsputpaidtoanyctionthatdemocracywasstillinplace(andthus
violatedwhathadbeenagreedatYalta).Thecommunistpartydispensedwithits
gleafintheformofsmallsatellitepartiesexistingofftothesides,nowvisibly
seizingallpowerinthecountry.However,eventhisdomesticlayerofauthority
wasactuallyactionofitsown,inthatitwaspackedwithSovietagents(not
leastPresidentBolesławBieruthimself),aswellasthousandsof"advisors”pro-
viding"much-neededhelp”withtheexerciseofpower,andmostespeciallythe
suppressionanderadicationofenemiesofthesystem.Whatweremainlyinvolved
hereweretheinternalsecurityservicesandindeedthearmedforces,therolesof
bothnowboilingdowntotherepressionofPolishcitizens.Rightoutintheopen
wasthefactthatPoland,sministerofdefencewasaSovietMarshal,Konstantin
Rokossovsky.Inaccountingforthesatellitestatusvis-à-visMoscow(i.e."thealli-
ancewiththefraternalSovietnation”),thecommunistsemployed,notonlyide-
ologicalargumentation(aninvocationoftheallegedsuperiorityandprogressive
natureofthesystemimposedbytheSovietUnion)butalsogeopoliticaljustica-
tions,inasmuchasthattheUSSRwouldbeassuringPolishsecurityinthefaceof
anyrevisionistpolicyonthepartofGermany.Afterall,thePotsdamagreementhad
providedforPolishannexationofaround100,000km2ofGermanterritory,afact
thatwasboundtoinstilinPolesafearthattheGermansmightseektogetatleast
partofthatareaback.
1.Therewasananti-GermanedgetothepactsignedbetweenStalinandBierut,
thelatterinfactaCominternagent,thoughpresenthereinhisroleasheadofthe
NationalCommitteeoftheHomeland(KRN)anentirelyunrepresentativebody
whosecompositionhadbeenagreedwithMoscow.SoanxiouswasStalintohave
thissignedthathedidnotevenchoosetowaitforthegovernmentthatwasto
ariseinlinewiththedecisionsoftheYaltaConference…andwasinanycaseto
beentirelysubordinatedtohim.TheTreatyonFriendship,MutualAssistanceand
Post-WarCooperationwassignedinMoscowon21April1945,byrepresentatives
oftheinterimcommunistgovernment.Itcontainedamutualdefenceclause,having
anactofaggressiononthepartofGermanyinview.Theaimherewastostrengthen
theinternationalandinternalpositionoftheinterimgovernment.Ontheocca-