Treść książki
Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
2.TheExternalRelationsofthePeople’sRepublicofPoland
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throughpoliticalandeconomicagreements,butalsothroughinformalmeetings
(notleastjointGierek–Giscardd,Estainghuntingsessions)werepresentedas
exemplarymodelsofhowstatesofdifferentsystemscouldworktogether.
SuchanopeninguptotheWestandchangeoffaceforPolandinternationally
weremuchneededbyWarsawinlightoftheextremelybadimpressiontheWesthad
gainedofPoland,sstate-sponsoredanti-SemitisminthewakeoftheMarch1968
studentprotests.Atthatpoint,theauthoritieshadrespondedtodemandsforaliber-
alisationofthepoliticalregimebyremovingthoseofJewishoriginorbackground
frompostsinpubliclifeandforcingthemtogoabroad.22Bywayofsuchaprimi-
tivecampaign,Polandnotonlylostthousandsofvaluablemembersoftheintellec-
tualandacademicelites,butalsogainedforitselfareputationforanti-Semitism.
TheopeninguptotheWestwouldalsonothavebeenpossiblewithoutdétente,
i.e.anewcooperativephasetothepeacefulcoexistenceofEastandWest.Initiated
bydeGaulle,sFrance,andthentakenupgraduallybyNixon,sUSAandBrezhnev,s
SovietUnion,thepolicyledtotheconcludingofmanyagreementsthatstabilised
thesecuritysituation,putregularpoliticaldialogueinplace,andmadecontacts
attheleveloftheindividualagreatdealeasier.Spectacularachievementsofthe
detenteprocessgettingunderwaybetweenthetwosuperpowerswerethe1972-3
summitmeetings,thesignatureofdeclarationsregardingmutualrelationsandsuch
armscontrolagreementsestablishingastrategicbalanceastheSALTandABM
Treaties.InthewakeofthebreakthroughinUS-Sovietrelations,talksinvolving
allthestatesinthetwoblocsbegantotakeplace,mostnotablytheConferenceon
SecurityandCooperationinEuropeof1972–1975,whichresultedinthe12August
1975signingofthefamousHelsinkiFinalActbytheleadersof35states.Itwas
thankstotheCSCEthatothercommuniststateswereabletobenefitfromthefruits
ofdétente.Polishdiplomacytooktheopportunitymostwillingly,achievingaquite
skilfulaffirmationofitsseparateidentity.AlongsideHungarythatwasalsoexperi-
encinggradualliberalisation,Polandwasabletopresentitselfasverymuchopento
thedevelopmentofawidevarietyofcontactswiththeWest.Poleswerealsoactive
indisarmamentnegotiationspursuedundertheaegisoftheCSCEpost1975.While
itistruetosaythatMoscowkeptcontroloverwhatwasgoingon,itdidtolerate
–withincertainlimits–theroomformanoeuvrethatWarsawwasabletodevelop
foritselfinthecourseofCSCEprocess.23Thoughforcedtoassumeobligationsin
thesphereofhumanrights,MoscowalsoviewedtheHelsinkiFinalActasadefini-
tiveconfirmationofthe"Yalta-Potsdamterritorialandpoliticalorder”.
22Thecampaignofanti-Semitismpursuedin1968wasanelementofthefactionalinfightingthen
takingplacewithintheParty,andrepresentingakindofrevengeofthe"nationalcommunists”againstthe
factiondescribedas"revisionist”–oreven"Zionist”inthestrongerversion.Underpinningthedesirefor
paybackwaswhatProfessorAdamSchaffwouldlaterdescribeinhisRuchkomunistycznynarozdrożu
[Thecommunistmovementatthecrossroads]asanover-representationofcommunistactivistsofJewish
origininpublic-securityinstitutionsandcutting-edgeideologypre-1956.
23Formore,see:A.D.Rotfeld,Europejskisystembezpieczeństwainstatunascendi[TheEuropean
securitysysteminstatunascendi],PISM,Warsaw1990.