Treść książki
Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
Pricestabilityandeconomicgrowth.Forachangeinthedoctrinalfoundationsofmonetarypolicy
ofthe1980sandthebeginningofthe1990sthedevelopedcountriesmanaged
toreachakindofconsensusinthismatterwhichbecamethebasisofmodern
doctrineofmid-termeconomicpolicyofthestateandmonetarypolicyofthe
centralbank.
Temainpointofthispolicy,whichinamoreorlessstrictform,hasbeen
implementedbyca.thirty
1
centralbanksworldwide,isreducedtotreatingprice
stability(lowinflation)asthemainpriorityofmid-termeconomicpolicyandsub-
ordinatingattainmentofthisobjectivenotonlytomonetarypolicyinstruments
butalsobudgetarypolicyinstruments.Pricestabilitystrategydominatesinsome
countriesoverotherprioritiesofthestate’seconomicpolicytosuchanextent
thatitisreflectedinthetextoftheconstitutionorotherkeylaws(Poland).Such
astronglegalsupportdoesnotgiveeconomicauthoritiesandespeciallycentral
banks,toomuchfreedominpursuingkeyobjectivesofthestate’seconomicpolicy,
includingalsoeconomicgrowthoremployment.Whatismore,itcancausethat
thereactionofauthoritiestodeviationsfromtherealrateofpricerisefromthe
adoptedlowinflationtargetmaybeasymmetric.Whentherateoftheforecast
pricerisedeviatesevenslightlyupwardsfromtheadoptedinflationtarget,the
centralbankauthorities,willingtotakeupimmediateactiontofulfiltheirobliga-
tions,maycauseaslowdownofgrowthprocessesintherealsphere.Ontheother
hand,inthecaseoftheinflationtargetnundershooting”
,theycanprocrastinate
withmonetarypolicyeasinginfearoffutureinflationacceleration,whichwillalso
haveanegativeimpactontherealspherefunctioning.
Afermorethanthirtyyearsofthelowinflationpolicyexperience(until2020)
anddirectinflationtargetstrategyitcanbestateddefinitelythatitcontributedto
stabilizinginflationindicatorsatalowlevelpracticallyinallcountrieswhichhad
implementedthispolicy.Itturnedoutthatcentralbankspossesstoolseńective
enoughtoańectinflationaryexpectationsandinflationindicatorswhichallow
them,inafairlyshorttime,toovercomeeventhefour-digitinflation,ifonlythey
1
Itisaproblemtopreciselydefinethenumberofcentralbanksfollowingthedirectinflationtarget
strategy(infationtargeters).Afairlybignumberofbanks(67in2017r.)settheinflationtarget,butit
doesnotmeanthattheycanautomaticallybequalifiedasinflationtargetersasasignificantnumber
amongthemdoesnotexactlycomplywiththekeydoctrinalrequirements.Ontheotherhand,some
centralbankscomplyquiteaccuratelywiththestrategyrequirementsbuttheydonotformallydeclare
itsadoption.Nearlythirtybanksdeclaringandimplementingthestrategyprinciplesisthenumberclose
totheestimatesfor2011oftheBankofEngland`sCentreforCentralBankingStudies.See:G.Ham-
mond.Stateoftheartinfationtargeting.BankofEnglandCentreforCentralBankingStudies.Bankof
England2011,p.7andonwards.Seealso:CentralBankNews.info-Atrustedandauthoritativesourceon
globalmonetarypolicy.http:llwww.centralbanknews.infolplinflation-targets.html(access:27.10.2017)
andP
.Błaszczyk.Stabilnośćcen–sposobydefnicjiorazwyzwaniadlapolitykipieniężnej.NBPMateriały
iStudia,ResearchBulletinNo.249,Warszawa2010,pp.50-55.
8
