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MAREKJANOLbRYCHT
ThePonticKingdom,ArsacidIranandArmenia:
RemarksonthePoliticalStrategy
ofMithradatesVIEupator(until89b.C.)
AfterMithradatesVIEupatorhadnoticedtheRo-
manexpensionarypolicyinAnatola,heformulated
precisewaraimsandpoliticalplanswhich,incon-
temporaryterms,maybecalledamilitaryandpoliti-
calstrategy.TheRomanstateposedathreatofsub-
jugatingthewholeAnatoliacoupledwitheffortsof
incorporatingthem.Havingcorrectlyidentifiedthe
capabilitiesandintentionsofRome,Eupatoraimedat
consolidationinsidethePonticstateandstrengthening
itspositionvis-à-visneighbouringpowers.becausehis
assessmentoftheabove-mentionedthreatswascorrect
hewasabletofightRomeformorethan25years.
Tostartwith,thenotionofmilitarystrategy
needssomeexplanation.Militarystrategyisdefined
astheartofdesigningandmanagingmilitarycam-
paigns.butmilitaryfactorsareinseparablefromthe
non-militaryonesinconductingthewarandinschemesdesignedforsecuring
thepeace.Thestartingpointofallstrategicplanningandactionsisstatepolicy
conductedbyitsleaders.CarlvonClausewitz,oneofthegreateststudentsof
strategy,summarisedthisrelationinthefollowingwords:“Warisnotmerely
apoliticalact,butalsoarealpoliticalinstrument,acontinuationofpolicycarried
outbyothermeans.”Thesameideasflourishedinantiquity,too.1Thus,onehave
1E.L.Wheeler:“MethodologicalLimitsandtheMirageofRomanStrategy:PartII.”
TheJournalofMilitaryHistory,vol.57,no.2,1993,p.221.
