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STUDIESINROMANGOVERNMENTANDSOCIETY
tienscumquevellet,quiderataliudnisidenuntiarepopuloRo-
manoservitutem?
Butwhatofthefactthathedaredtosayatapublicmeetingthat,
whenhehadlaiddownhisofce,hewouldbepresentcloseto
thecitywithanarmy,andwouldenteritasoftenashepleased?
WhatdidthismeanbutathreattotheRomanpeopleofslavery?
Suchasolutionstemmedfromtraditionaswellasfromthefact
thatuntilthereformsofC.Mariustheorganizationofnumerous
policeforceswouldhavebeensignificantlytroublesomeastheRo-
manstatelackedeventhepermanentmilitaryforces.Tearmywas
akindofcitizen)smilitiaofatemporarynatureandwasappointed
bytheauthoritiesdependingonthethreat.4Tus,ifRomewasnot
directlyendangeredbyforeigninvasion,therewerenoforcesof
amilitaryorpolicenaturestationedwithintheCity.Temagis-
tratesresponsibleformaintainingthepublicorderhadnodevel-
opedcoerciveapparatusattheirdisposal.5Inthecaseofmassiveri-
ots,itwasobligatoryforhigher-rankingmagistratestointervene.6
Tesituationofthelatterwasalsonotmuchbetter,however.Ad-
mittedly,inofcialstatementstheywouldappearaccompanied
bytheirentourage,composedoflictors,whosepresenceserved
merelyasasymbolofthepowerofthemagistracy;besides,there
wereonlyfew,perhapsadozenorso,ofthem.,
TestorybyLivycapturestheprevalentsystemoftheseforces,
evenifthetoldnarrativeisnottrue:;
Subhancpessimiexemplivictoriamdilectusedicitur,paventi-
busquetribunissineintercessioneullaconsulesremperagunt.
[2]Tumveroirasciplebstribunorummagissilentioquamcon-
4Nippel(1995)4.
6Freis(1967)3;Nippel(1995)21.
,Schäfer(1989)196-232.
;Liv.2.55.1-9,trans.O.Foster,cf.3.45-6;Cass.Dio38.6.1-3.Lintott(1968)89-90;
Nippel(1984)22-3.
2
