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12
Introduction
Thiscreatesahugechallengeandincreasesdemographicriskforcontractsfi-
nancedbypay-as-you-gopensionschemes,wherethebenefitsofthegenerationsof
retireesarefinancedfromcurrentcontributionsorgeneraltaxesoftheworking
generations.It'seasytoguessthatthefinancialbasisofsuchasystemisverydif-
ferentwhenthereisonepensionerforapproximately4employees,anditwillbe
moredifficulttosecurefinancingwhenin20-30yearsthisratiowillamountto3:1,
andinthemiddleofthetwenty-firstcenturytoonlyabout2:1inEuropeancoun-
tries.Asaconsequence,therehavebeengrowingproblemsinbalancingthefunds
generatedfrompensioncontributions(orfromgeneraltaxes)offundsintendedfor
thepaymentofpensions.
Highhopeswereassociatedwithasolutionofintroducingalayer(pillar)fi-
nancedbycapital(promotedbyWorldBankduringthe90s),wheretheworking
generationallocatesitspensioncontributionsasretirementsavingsbyinvesting
(throughpensionfunds)inthecapitalmarket.However,itturnedoutintheafter-
mathoftheglobalfinancialcrisisof2008-2009,thatsuchamethodoffinancingof
pensionsystemsisalsoquiterisky.Insomecountriesthevalueofpensionfund
assetsdecreasedbyupto30%.Moreover,itturnedouttobeveryexpensiveto
switchfromthePAYGsystemtoamixedPAYG-fundedsystem,whereforseveral
yearsonehastopaybenefitstothosewhoacquiredtherighttopensioninthe
PAYGsystem,andinthemeantimethevalueofavailablecontributionsinthe
PAYGpartofthenewmixedsystemisreduced(becausetherestisinvestedinthe
financialmarket).InanumberofcountriesinSouthAmericaandinthepost-
socialistonesthishasresultedinfinancialturmoilandthegrowthofpublicdebt.
Asaresult,alotofcountrieshaveeithercompletelyeliminatedthefullyfunded
pillar(e.g.ArgentinaandHungary),orhavereduceditdramatically(reducedcon-
tributions,changeinthecapitalfundedstatusfromamandatorytoavoluntaryone
inPoland).
Someexperts,alreadyatthestageofintroducingafullyfundedpillarinpublic
pensionsystems,indicatethatcapitalfinancingdoesnoteliminatedemographic
risk,becauseonewayoranothertheworkinggenerationwillhavetopurchase
financialassetsaccumulatedinpensionfundsbytheretiringgeneration.Inthis
sense,forexample,apurchaseoftreasurysecuritiesisnodifferentfromthepay-
mentofpensionbenefitsregisteredinthePAYGsystem,whicharenotaccompa-
niedbyfinancialassets.Inmacroeconomictermsapensionsystemisinfact
amechanismforthedistributionofthegrossdomesticproductbetweenthework-
inggenerationandthegenerationofretirees.
Dependingonthepointofview,pensionreformsintroducedbyanumberof
countriesattheturnofthetwentiethandthetwenty-firstcentury(inresponsetoan
increaseindemographicrisk)canbeconsideredpartiallyorcompletelyunsuccess-
ful,buttherearealsocountrieswherethemulti-pillarpensionsystemsarefunc-
tioningprettywell(e.g.Sweden,Switzerland,TheNetherlands).Mostoften,how-
ever,capitalfundedpillarscreateadditionalorsupplementarypensionschemes
(enterpriseorindividualones).InthecaseofSweden,arelativelysmallequity
