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JaroslavVostatek
asstateenterprisesorpublichousingauthorities–oftenatbelow-marketinterest
ratesthatbecomenegativeinrealtermsduringinflationaryperiods”[Jamesetal.
1994,p.94].Itsimplyisnottruethatthepublicsectorisalwayslesseffectivethan
theprivatesector:pensionsareagreatexample.Thiscanbeexplainedbythefocus
onpredominantlysimplehandlingofmoney.Anotherexplanationistheruleappli-
cableinmanylargefinancialgroups:theyarenotonly“toobigtofail”,butalso
“toobigtosave”.Afterall,eveninvestmentreturnsofprivatefinancialinstitutions
aresignificantlyaffectedbygovernmentregulation.
Neoliberalsrequirethereplacementofconservative/social-democraticpension
designswithaprivatemarketproduct/scheme.Theexpectedorpromisedbenefitis
asignificantlyhigherpensioncomparedtoexistingpublicpensions,e.g.fromso-
cialinsuranceschemes.Thisistobeachievedbyinvestmentsofpensionfundsin
capitalmarkets.Thetrivialneoliberalinterpretationoftheprivatesectorbenefits
reliesonsimplereasoningthatIhadrepeatedlycomeacrossinAmericanpress,for
example:MrBrownpaidcontributionfortheAmericanpensionsecurityscheme
forprivateemployeesintheamountof$xperyearand,after35yearsofinsurance
coverage,heisentitledtoapensionof$yperyear.IncaseMrBrownhadthepos-
sibilitytoinvestthesecontributionsinanaveragemutualfundwithreturnof8%
peryear,hewouldhavesavedfivetimesasmuch(comparedtohiscontributions)
and,consequently,hispensioncouldhavebeenaboutfivetimeshighercompared
towhathewouldreceivefromtheUSSocialSecurity.Thisisit–calculationof
compoundinterest;inthisspecificcase,theamountreceivedbyasaverafter
35periodsofcompoundinterestwithaninterestrateof8%–thisistheeconomic
“miracle”,onwhichtheneoliberalpensiontheory/policyisbuilt.
Inthepreviousdecades,averageinvestmentreturnsofpensionfundsindevel-
opedcountrieswereveryhighanditcouldapply–onalarge-scaleinternational
average–thatitwouldhavebeenveryprofitabletoparticipateinafullyfunded
system,comparedtoapay-as-you-gouniversalsocialold-ageinsurancescheme.In
somecountries,e.g.intheNetherlands,clientsundoubtedlymadeaprofitonthis.
Ontheotherhand,clientsinWestGermanymadesignificantprofitsasaresultof
theAdenauer’spensionreformof1957,duringwhichthefullyfundedsystemwas
abandoned.Itgenerallyappliesthatitisbettertohavefundsthannottohavethem;
however,itisalsonecessarytoexpandthisdeliberationwithsystemreturnsand
costs.Virtuallyeveryoneknowsthisingeneral;however,neoliberalshaveashort
connectioninthisregardanddonotattempttosearchforanappropriatebench-
marktospecificparametersofprivatepensionfunds.Suchbenchmarkwould
mainlybeapublicfullyfundedpensionscheme.Onlythenitispossibletocom-
pareittoapay-as-you-gopublicpensionscheme,becausetransformationcostswill
ariseinthecourseofthepublicsystemprivatizationandsuchcostsmustbecov-
ered.Anditwouldnotbefairtocoversuchcostsattheexpenseofpublicpensions
todayorinthefuture,forexample.
Thereturnsofpensionfundsinthepastdecadesaresubjecttointensivere-
searchoftheOECD.Withregardtothe25-yearperiodendingin2007,average
