Treść książki
Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
oneyearinprison,andfined$2,000.TheCourtofAppealsforthe
FifthDistrictofTexasatDallasaffirmedJohnson’sconviction,
buttheTexasCourtofCriminalAppealsreversed,holdingthat
theStatecouldnot,consistentwiththeFirstAmendment,punish
Johnsonforburningtheflaginthesecircumstances.
II
Johnsonwasconvictedofflagdesecrationforburningtheflag,rather
thanforutteringinsultingwords.Thisfactsomewhatcomplicates
ourconsiderationofhisconvictionundertheFirstAmendment.
WemustfirstdeterminewhetherJohnson’sburningoftheflag
constitutedexpressiveconduct,permittinghimtoinvokethe
FirstAmendmentinchallenginghisconviction.See,e.g.,Spence
v.Washington,418U.S.405,409-411(1974).Ifhisconductwas
expressive,wenextdecidewhethertheState’sregulationisrelated
tothesuppressionoffreeexpression.IftheState’sregulationis
notrelatedtoexpression,thenthelessstringentstandardwe
announcedinUnitedStatesv.O’Brien,391U.S.367(1968),for
regulationsofnoncommunicativeconductcontrols.Ifitis,then
weareoutsideofO’Brien’stest,andwemustaskwhetherthis
interestjustifiesJohnson’sconvictionunderamoredemanding
standard.3)AthirdpossibilityisthattheState’sassertedinterest
issimplynotimplicatedonthesefacts,and,inthatevent,the
interestdropsoutofthepicture.
Indecidingwhetherparticularconductpossessessufficient
communicativeelementstobringtheFirstAmendmentintoplay,
wehaveaskedwhetherK[a]nintenttoconveyaparticularized
messagewaspresent,and[whether]thelikelihoodwasgreat
thatthemessagewouldbeunderstoodbythosewhoviewedit.”
Especiallypertinenttothiscaseareourdecisionsrecognizing
thecommunicativenatureofconductrelatingtoflags.Attaching
(b)Forpurposesofthissection,Kdesecrate”meansdeface,damage,orotherwise
physicallymistreatinawaythattheactorknowswillseriouslyoffendoneor
morepersonslikelytoobserveordiscoverhisaction.
(c)AnoffenseunderthissectionisaClassAmisdemeanor.
3)AlthoughJohnsonhasraisedafacialchallengetoTexas’flagdesecration
statute,wechoosetoresolvethiscaseonthebasisofhisclaimthatthestatute,
asappliedtohim,violatestheFirstAmendment.[…]Becausetheprosecutionof
apersonwhohadnotengagedinexpressiveconductwouldposeadifferentcase,
andbecausethiscasemaybedisposedofonnarrowergrounds,weaddressonly
Johnson’sclaimthat§42.09,asappliedtopoliticalexpressionlikehis,violates
theFirstAmendment.
12
Introduction
