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WojciechLorenz
consumelimiteddefenceresourcesandarethereforereluctanttosupport
astrategicadaptationtoconventionalstate-to-statewarfare.Theyalsoargue
thatthethreatfromRussiaisexaggeratedortemporaryandapermanent
presenceontheeasternflankwillonlyfurtherprovokePresidentVladimir
Putin.Irrespectiveoftheirmotivation,thefactremainsthatthereisnosingle,
unifyingthreatperceptionacrosstheAlliance.Tosolvethisweakness,NATO
willhavetoimproveitsabilitytodealwiththemostacutethreatsonthe
prioritylistsofdifferentmemberstates.Withdivergentthreatperceptions,it
willbecrucialtostrengthentheAlliancethroughcommonintereststomake
itmoreresponsivetoawidespectrumofchallenges.
Fourth.Whilestrengtheningitsdefencecapability,NATOmustcome
toconsensusonnewrelationswithRussia.ItmatterswhetherRussiais
treatedofficiallyasapartner,apotentialthreatoranadversarybecauseit
willtranslateintolong-termNATOpolicies.NATOwillhavetoinitiatethe
discussiononthechangesinitsstrategicdocumentstobeabletodefendits
territoryandwesternvaluesaswell.Ontheotherhand,itshouldbeableto
supportOSCEandEUeffortstorebuildthesecurityorderinEurope,with
Russiaaspartofit.
Fifth.WithanewstrategicrealityinwhichRussiacouldbeageopolitical
challenge,NATOwillhavetoreinvigorateitsopen-doorpolicy.Inthe
newsecuritycontext,itisimportanttorememberthatfurtherenlargement
willcomplicatethedecision-makingprocessandnewmembersmayneed
tobedefended.Butenlargementisapotentmechanismforstrengthening
thestabilityandpredictabilityofstates.Additionally,freezingenlargement
wouldonlyconvinceRussiathatitspolicyofintimidationisworking,which
couldencouragefurtheraggressivebehaviourinthepost-Sovietareaand
beyond,withpotentiallydramaticlong-termconsequencesforEurope.
Sixth.Lastbutnotleast,todealeffectivelywitharesurgentRussiaandthe
securityvacuumintheMENAregion,thetransatlanticlinkbetweenEuropeand
theU.S.mustbestrengthened.Thisunifyingbond—crucialforthecredibility
oftheAlliance’sdefences—wasweakenedbythegrowingdisparitybetween
U.S.andEuropeandefencespendingandthemassivedecreaseoftheU.S.
militarypresenceinEurope.Ideally,Europeanmembersshouldincreasetheir
defencespendingtothemandatedminimumof2%ofGDP.Still,thismaybe
unrealisticforsometime.Itis,however,possiblethattheEuropeanAllieswill
bereadyformorebalancedburden-sharingwithmeaningfulsupportforthe
worldwidepartnershipsthatformamajorpillarofNATO’sglobalreach.
12
ThePolishQuarterlyofInternationalAffairs,2016,no.1
