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Apartfromthehardware,oneofthemostimportantqualities
ofNATOistheabilitytoadapttochangingcircumstancesandrecover
fromcrises.LeavingasidethestormystrategicdebatesoftheColdWar
times,NATOmanagedinthelastdecadestosurvivethedissolution
ofitsarch-enemytheSovietUnion,tensionsoverenlargementand
Kosovo,a“near-death”experienceofthedivisionsoverthe2003Iraq
war,andtherecentcontroversiesoverstrategyandburdensharing
inAfghanistan.Lookingfromsuchaperspective,thecurrent
challengesthereforeseemfullymanageable,providedthatthepolitical
classandthewiderpopulationcontinuetoseethebenefitsofNATO
membershipinalltheaspectsdescribedabove.
ThediscussiononthefutureofNATOneedstobeproperly
structured,startingfromthemostimportantissuesandlatermoving
totheoperationaldetails.ThecrucialtaskforNATOwouldbetoagree
anewinternalconsensusregardingthreatassessment.Thereisnoneed
tore-inventNATOhere:thenecessarybuildingblocksarealready
inplace,intheformoftheWashingtonTreatyandthethreecoretasks
identifiedbytheStrategicConceptadoptedinLisbon.NATOcannot
becomeaone-dimensionalorganisation,buthastotakeintoaccount
thefullspectrumofthreatsandchallenges.Asconcernedasweare
inCentralEuropeaboutRussia’scurrentactions,outsouthernpartners
arerightwhentheyobservethatthethreatscomingfromAfricaandthe
MiddleEast(includingterrorismandmassmigration)seemmoredirect
andpalpabletotheirpopulationsthanthreatsfromtheEast.Both
strategicdirectionswouldneedtobe“secured,”withNATOremaining
vigilantaboutthethreatsthatmaycomefromafurtherdistance(or
fromcyberspace).Thenewthreatassessmentshouldtakeintoaccount
thefactthatthedivisionbetweenopponentsrelyingonsymmetricand
asymmetricmodesofoperationhasbeenblurredtosuchanextentthat
NATOwouldneedtodealroutinelywithcomplexcontingenciesand
surprises.Insuchcases,thethreatmaynotfitevenmostliberal
definitionsof“armedattack,”yetitwillstillrequirearesponsefrom
thealliance.
Secondly,NATOalliesshouldnotunderestimatethestrategic
consequencesofincreasedrelianceontheUnitedStatesintermsofthe
capabilitiesofthearmedforcesandengagementinoperationsforthe
conditionofthetransatlanticbond.In2012,U.S.defenceexpenditures
accountedfor72%oftheoverallNATOcountries’total,upmorethan
20%fromtheColdWarera.Thisfiguremaydecreaseslightlyinthe
