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JohnL.Campbell
PartyMovement,blazedatrailofinflammatory
rhetoricinthefewyearsleadinguptothepresidential
election.Inotherwords,theFreedomCaucustilled
thesoilfromwhichTrump’seffectiverhetoricgrew
(Gervais&Morris,2018).
Certainly,thereissometruthtothelistofex-
planationsIjustmentionedaboutwhyTrumpwon.
Contingencieslikethesealwaysaffectelections.
Butalltheseargumentsmissthepoint.There
weremuchdeeperlong-termtrendsatworkthat
havebeenvirtuallyignoredsofarintheliterature.
Buttwostandout.OneattributesTrump’svictory
tochangesinthenormsofAmericanpolitics-
thedeclineofcivilityinpoliticaldiscourse(Dionne
etal.,2017).Theotherpointstothedeclining
fortunesofthewhiteworkingclassthatmight
helpsomeonelikeTrump(Hochschild,2016;
Vance,2016).Thereissometruthtothistoo.
ButIarguethatthelong-termtrendsarefarmore
complexthanthis.Trumprodetovictoryon
awaveofpublicdiscontentthathadbeenbuilding
sincethe1970s-awaveconsistingoffourlong-
standingtrendsinAmericansocietythathave
graduallytransformedAmericanpolitics,andone
bigcatalyst.Theimplicationsofhisvictoryfor
publicgovernancearebecomingclear,andthey
aren’tpretty.I’llgettothatlaterbutfirstlet’ssee
whyTrumpgotelected.2
Theeconomy
Thefirsttrendwaseconomic.Nearlyahalf-
centuryofwagestagnation,risinginequality,
diminishingupwardmobility,mountingprivate
debt,anddecliningprivatesectoremployment,
particularlyintraditionalmanufacturingindustries,
ispartofthestory.Duringthelate1960sandearly
1970saveragewagesgrewabout2.5%annually.
Sincethen,however,theybarelybudged.Between
1973and2000medianfamilyincomeintheUnited
Statesstagnated,inchedupabitforthenextfew
years,butthenstalledagain(Misheletal.,2012,
2Theargumentsinthispaperareexploredinmore
detailinCampbell(2018).
p.179).Thiswasaparticularlytoughproblem
duringthelatterhalfofthe1970sandearly1980s
when,thankstotwooilshocks,inflationhit
doubledigitsonlytobebroughtundercontrolby
aseveretighteningofmonetarypolicythatthrew
theeconomyintoarecession.
TomakeendsmeettheaverageAmericanfamily
hadthreeoptions.Onewasworkmorehours,which
manydid(Leicht&Fitzgerald,2014,p.47).The
secondwastosavelessmoney,orspendmoney
alreadysaved.Beginningin1975thesavingsrate
foraverageAmericanfamiliesdeclined.By2005,
ithadslippedbelowzero-peoplewerespending
downwhateversavingstheyhad(Rhee,2013).The
thirdoptionwasborrowingmoney.From1973to
2011averagehouseholddebtrosefrom67%to
119%ofdisposablepersonalincome(Mishelet
al.2012,p.405).Allofthiswasnecessaryfor
theBabyBoomgenerationtomaintainthesame
standardoflivingastheirparent’sgeneration.It’s
evenharderfortoday’syoungadults.Inshort,
peoplehavehadtorunfasterandfasterjustto
stayinthesameplace.Manypeoplewereunable
todoso,whichiswhyAmericanmiddle-class
prosperityhasbecomemoreofanillusionthan
areality(Leicht&Fitzgerald,2006;Temin,2017).
Muchofthiswasduetostructuralchanges
intheeconomy.Beginningintheearly1970s
manytraditionalU.S.manufacturingjobswere
exportedfromtheNortheastandupperMidwest
totheSunbeltintheSouthandSouthwestwhere
unionswereweakerornon-existentandwages
andbenefitswerelower.Jobswerealsoeither
outsourcedtoforeigncountriesoreliminated
entirelybytechnologicalimprovementslike
computerisationandrobotics.Downsizingbecame
thewatchwordformanyU.S.firms.Noteveryone
sufferedequally.Astheshiftfrommanufacturingto
amoreservice-orientedeconomyproceededthose
whomanagedtogetgoodeducationsorupgrade
theirskills,particularlyinwaysthatmadethem
technologicallysavvy,didalright.Butthosewho
didnot,notablypeoplefromtheworkingclassor
poor,faredworse(Bluestone&Harrison,1988;
Danziger&Gottschalk,1997).
6
ZarządzaniePubliczne/PublicGovernance4(46)/2018
