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1.3.TheBeginningoftheOperation
However,theabovedescribedmaintrendsandstagesoverviewofthe
operation’sdevelopmentdoesnotexplainitsorigins.Teoperationsevolution
phenomenonisofendiscussed,andtheauthors-bothPolishandforeign
agreeonitsessentialelements.Terefore,itseemsappropriatetoaskwhether
theissueofthephenomenonoriginisimportantenoughtoattractattention?
Itis,foratleasttworeasons.First-thediagnosis.Onecannotbesurethatthe
diagnosisiscorrectuntilallcausesandtheirinterrelationshipsarethoroughly
understood.Second-aforecast.Teforecastmaynotbecorrectifallrelevant
factorsarenottakenintoaccount(and,inprinciple,itmayonlybecorrect
bychance).Terefore,ifweassumethecontentdescribedaspartofthe
theoreticalfunctionofoperationalartasbinding,weshouldconsistently
strivetoenhanceourknowledge.
AndrzejCzupryńskibelievesthatWhenlookingfortheoperation
beginnings,thebeginningsshouldbeseenintheorganisationalsphereoflarge
armies’employmentinthe17thand18thcenturies.However,thesizeofthe
armyshouldnotbeseenasacriterionforanoperation,becausemany-thousands
armieswerealsoorganisedinantiquity.Hence,itwasnotthesizeofthearmy
thatgaverisetooperations,butthewayitwasusedinthewartheatre.me
thesisthattheoperationestablishmentwasdeterminedbythescientifcand
technicaldevelopmentandthesizeofthearmyisnotwell-founded24.Similarly,
thesizeofthewarfareareathesisprecludesanoperationhappening.However,
theoperationorganisationapproachdoesnotexcludetheoperationfrom
happening.meoperationcameintobeingaspartofthewar.Acampaignbrings
togetherpoliticalandmilitaryobjectives,whiletheoperationindicatesthesphere
ofthemilitaryobjectiveonly.Asitoriginallyhappenedinabattle,themilitary
objectivesofthewarareresolveddirectlyinoperation.meoperation’sactions
areaimeddirectlyattheobject,notthepurposeofthewar.Weinfluencethewar
objectivebyachievingtheobject.Notalwayshasoneoperationmadeitpossible
toachievetheobjective,asitwasthecaseofabattleinancienttimes.Itseems
24
AlreadyattheBattleofMegiddoin1469BCTuthmosisIIIused20thousand
warriors.IntheBattleofLakeTrasimenein217BCwastheclashofabout70,000soldiers.
InthebattleintheCatalaunianPlainsof451betweenRomeandAttila’swarriors,there
wereabout170,000soldierskilledintotal.Hence,thedeterminantofanumberorarea
shouldnotbethecriterion,butonlyadescriptivefactorwhichcharacterisesaspecific
operation.
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