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Introduction.EuropeanPoliciesandChangeintheEUIntegrationModel
oftheCommission.Onthecontrary,thatautonomyhasinfactbeenlimited,with
increasedsupervisionofintergovernmentalinstitutionsovertheworkoftheEuropean
Commission(Bickertonetal.,2015b:713-715).Atthesametime,theCommission
ceasedtobetheleadingexecutiveinstitutionfordecisionsofnationalgovernments.An
examplewastheentrustingofthetaskofimplementingfinancialaidforcrisis-affected
countriestotheso-calleduEuropeantroika,”formedbytheCommission,andrepre-
sentativesoftheECBandtheInternationalMonetaryFund.Thisundoubtedlyrestricted
thefreedomanddiscretionofactionoftheCommissionwhenperformingthattask
(Hodson,2015).Otherscholarspointoutthat,althoughtheimplementationpowersof
theECincreased,thesewereatthesametimerestrictedinrespectofpoliticalinitiative
andthedecision-makingprocess(Fabbrini,2015a:27;Fabbrini,2015b:266).Itcanbe
concludedthattheenforcementpowersoftechnocraticinstitutionsareontheincrease,
whereastheirpoliticalpowersarenot(Mény,2014:1344-1345).Itisclearlyvisiblethat
powersweretransferredfromtheMemberStatestotheEuropeanlevel,andostensibly
concentratedinthehandsofintergovernmentalinstitutions.Yetinformally,thesehave
beentakenonbythelargestMemberStates.TherealpowerinEuropewastransferred
intotheirhands,andthedisciplinaryprocedureoftheEuropeanSemesterwasjustone
ofthewaysinwhichameanstothatendwasprovided.
TheincreaseddelegationofpowerstotheCommissionwasconsistentwiththeGer-
manapproachtoEuropeanintegration,alreadybeforecharacterisedbyastrength-
eningofthetechnocraticinstitutionsoftheEUwithaviewtoagreementsconcluded
bytheMemberStatesbeingimplementedmorereadily.WithrespecttoEMU,this
mostlyinvolvedimplementationoffiscalcriteria.TheprocedureoftheEuropean
Semester(likethesubsequentarrangementsoftheFiscalCompact)wastherefore
supposedtosupportGermananti-crisisobjectiveswithrespecttofiscalconsolidationin
theMemberStates.Accordingtoobserverswhobelongedtotheinnercircleofadvisers
ofPresidentBarroso,theCommissionrepresentativesduringthecrisisweregreatly
influencedbyGermandiplomats,andinmostcasessupportedthestanceregarding
anti-crisispolicyadoptedbyBerlin(Sandbu,2014).Owingtothis,theyearnedBerlin’s
trust,anditwasthankstothatthattheCommissionexpandeditspowersineconomic
governance.However,insodoing,itbecamemoreofatoolforcarryingforward
theobjectivesofthemostinfluentialnationalpoliticiansthananautonomousplayerin
Europeanpolitics(Zielonka,2014:19).Someevencallthisuthestraitjacket”withwhich
creditors,andnotablytheGermangovernment,restrainedtheCommission(Schmidt,
2015:109-110).Anadditionalelementtothoserestraintswasthedelegationofwide
powerstotheCommissionerresponsibleforeconomicandfinancialmatters.Until
2014,thisfunctionwasperformedbytherepresentativefromFinland,whosestance
ontheanti-crisispolicywassimilartothatofGermany.Thepurposewastoreduce
thepreviouscollegialitywithintheCommissionand,consequently,thepossibilityfor
MemberStatesotherthanthecreditorstoexertaninfluence.
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