Treść książki
Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
TomaszGrzegorzGrosse
ItisworthmentioninghowGermanpoliticianssoonaccusedtheCommission
ofbeingtoosubmissivetoFrance,anditsdemandsthatthedeadlineforittoadjust
itsbudgetdeficittoEuropeancriteriashouldbeextended(FinancialTimes,2014b).9
FranceobjectedtotheexcessiveausteritymeasuresimposedbyGermanyduring
thecrisis,threetimesforcingtheCommissiontoextendFrance’sdeadlineforthefiscal
adjustment(thefinaldatewassetfor2017).TherepresentativesfromGermanyand
FinlandconsideredthoseactionsarbitraryandungroundedinEuropeanUnionlaw.
RegardlessofwhetheritwasBerlinorParisthathadgreaterbehind-the-scenes
influenceontheCommission,bothexamplesattesttothefar-reachingpoliticalinfluence
themajorcapitalsexertonaCommunityinstitutionthatisintheorysupposedtobe
impartialandapolitical.TheECbecameanarenaforone-upmanshipattemptsamong
thestrongestMemberStates,andforpoliticalbargainingbetweenthem(Parsonsand
Matthijs,2015:224).
Anotherillustrationofthephenomenainquestionmaybeprovidedbytheadoption
oftheso-calledreversedmajorityvotingmechanismforproceduresenforcingthefiscal
criteria.Itwasdesignedtoincreasetheautomatismofsanctionsimposedoncountries
whichdidnotmeetthosecriteriaand,atthesametime,tomakeitdifficultfordecisions
madebyintergovernmentalinstitutionstoannulpenaltiessuggestedbytheCom-
mission.SucharulewasconsistentwithGermanpreferences.Itindirectlystrengthened
theCommission’sauthorityasregardssupervisionoverthebudgetarypoliciesof
nationalgovernments,sinceitwouldbemoredifficultfortheMemberStatestoreject
sanctionsimposedbytheCommission.However,theautomatismofsanctionsin
thefinalversionofutheSixpack”cametobewatereddown,withtheintroduction
ofthepossibilityofCommissionproposalsbeingchangedbytheCouncilbywayof
asimple-majorityvotingprocedure(nottheureversed”one).10Regardlessofthefact
thatthegovernmentsstillhavethelastsayintheprocedureinquestion(Cisotta,2013),
thepracticesofarshowsthatthestringencyoftheCommission’ssanctionsmight
beadditionallyreducedbytheinformalinfluenceofthelargestMemberStates.An
analysisofthesituationleadstotheconclusionthatthepreviouslyobservedleniency
oftheCommissiontowardstheviolationoftheStabilityandGrowthPactcriteriaby
certainMemberStatesmightcontinueinthefuture(Falkner,2013).
Asmentionedbefore,animportantconsequenceoftheprocedureoftheEuropean
SemesterisastrengtheningofthepowerofEuropeaninstitutionsovernationalfiscal
9Anextensionofdeadlinesforthefiscaladjustmentwasalsograntedtoothercountriesduringthe
crisis,e.g.Italy,SpainandPortugal.TheCommissionclearlysurrenderedpoweroverfiscalpolicytothe
governmentsattimesofcrisis.TheEuropeanCommissionerforEconomicandFinancialAffairsPierre
MoscovicisaiduthedecisivestepontheStabilityandGrowthPactdoesn’tdependonus,”addingthatthe
EuropeanCouncilonwhichtheMemberStatessit,uisthemasteroftheagenda”(EUobserver,2016a).
10
AlthoughtheFiscalCompactreintroducedtheureversed”majorityvotingmechanisminthatmatter,
itmustbestressedthattheCompactwasconcludedoutsidetheEUstructure,andisthusoflessersignif-
icancethanCommunitylaw.
20