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Introduction.EuropeanPoliciesandChangeintheEUIntegrationModel
policies.Itisanexampleoftheexpansionofso-calledunegativefiscalfederalism”in
theEU,whichentailstherestrictionofnationalpoliciesbyEuropeaninstitutionsand
laws.AnotherexampleofthesametrendistheaforementionedFiscalCompact,which
imposesnewobligationsasregardssignatoryMemberStates’budgetarypolicies.Italso
increasesthemonitoringanddisciplinaryroleofEuropeaninstitutions,i.e.through
bilateralpartnershipagreementsconcludedaspartoftheCompactbetweenparticular
MemberStates,theCommissionandtheCouncil(Crum,2013:621).
Theincreaseinthedelegationofsupervisorypowerstotechnocraticinstitutions
strengthenstheirauthorityoverMemberStates’fiscalpolicies,andjustifiestheappli-
cationofthetermuexecutivefederalism”(orutechnocraticfederalism”)inEurope
(Crum,2013:614-615;Schütze,2010).Thishappensunderthesupervisionof
intergovernmentalinstitutions,inparticularinvolvingthelargestMemberStates.
InthecaseoftheEuropeanSemester,theadditionalpowersoftheCommissionare
ofanexecutiveanddisciplinarynature,whereaspoliticaldecisionsarestillmadeby
intergovernmentalinstitutions.Otherscallituauthoritarianstatism”
,emphasising
howtheexpansionoftheEUtechnocracy’sremitinthisareaconcealstheinfluenceof
thedominantMemberStates,andtheinterestsoftheirmostprivilegedsocialgroups
(SandbeckandSchneider,2014:859).
Similarphenomenaaretobeobservedinotherareasofanti-crisismeasures.For
example,asregardstheFiscalCompact,theleadingroleofnationalgovernmentswas
increasedbythemannerofitsadoption,i.e.onthebasisofaninternationalagreement
infactconcludedbeyondtheEuropeanTreaties.TheCommissionwas,asitwere,
uhired”bytheconcernedgovernments,tocarryoutimplementation-relatedtasks
(Amtenbrink,2012:137-139;Fabbrini,2014:66).Anotherexampleofsimilartrends
wasprovidedbytheinformalincreaseoftheroleoftheEuropeanCentralBankin
thefiscalpolicyarea.Thiswasduetotheevermorefar-reachingandnon-standard
interferenceoftheECBinthedebtoftheMemberStates,aswellasitsassumingof
theroleoflenderoflastresort(Grosse,2013b).Simultaneously,theECBbecamemore
politicised,aswasreflectedintheever-strongerinfluenceofthelargestEMUmembers
onitsactions.TheEuropeanCentralBankbecameanarenaforcompetitivestruggle
betweentheMemberStates,aswasespeciallyreflectedwithrespecttotheso-called
quantitativeeasing,i.e.theincreasingofliquidityonfinancialmarkets.Insofaras
thetroubledcountriesandFrancesupportedthepolicyofthePresidentoftheEuropean
CentralBankMarioDraghiinthatrespect,Germany’srepresentatives(withthesupport
ofthoseofTheNetherlandsandFinland)mostoftenopposedhispolicy(Jones,2016).
Sometimes,theBankwasusedbythedominantMemberStatestoexertpressureon
thecrisis-hitcountries,inordertomakethemimplementthefiscalreformstheir
creditorsanticipated.Thiswas,forexample,thecaseduringthetoughnegotiations
betweentheEurogroupandthegovernmentofGreeceoverthethirdrescuepackagein
2015.AnadditionalargumentforGreecetoacceptthestancepreferredbythebiggest
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