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TomaszGrzegorzGrosse
euroareacountrieswasthethreatthatliquidityassistancefromtheECBforGreek
bankswouldbewithheld(Jones,2015).
TheECBmeasuresinquestionweretakenwithaviewtothecrisisbeingovercome,
andthusaroseoutofimmediateneed,ratherthanadesiretoexpandECB’powers.
TheywerealsoaneffectoftheMemberStates’avoidanceofinstitutionalreformsin
thedirectionoffiscalpolicycentralisationintheEMU(Schelkle,2014;Grosse,2013c).
Whatismeantbythisisthegovernments’reluctancetointroducetheso-calledupositive
fiscalfederalism”
,andthusshiftthepowersandinstrumentsofthefiscalpolicyto
theEuropeanlevel.TheseincludeEuropeantaxes,anincreasingintheEUbudget,debt
communitarisationandredistributivetransfers(bothcounter-cyclicalsocialtransfers
orautomaticstabilizers,andinvestmenttransfersaimedatinducingstructuralreforms
intheweakesteconomies).Omissionsonthepartofthegovernments,andthepressure
ontheECBexertedbysomenationalpoliticians,causedsomeoftheaforementioned
measurestobeintroduceduthroughthebackdoor”
,namelybyunconventionalmeasures
resortedtobytheBank.Thishasimportantsystemicconsequences,asitshiftscertain
nationalpowerstotheEuropeanlevel(thoughadmittedly,onlybyafaitaccompli;not
byamendmentstotheTreaties).
Howcanweevaluatetheaforesaidchangestointegrationprocesses?Theshiftof
independentfiscalpowersfromthenationalleveltotheEuropeanwasmadewith-
outsuitablestrengtheningofdemocraticinstitutionsintheEU,andthusactedto
thedetrimentofdemocracyinEurope.Thechangesinquestionmaynotthereforebe
consideredconducivetodemocraticfederalism(Grosse,2014b).Thereturntonational
interestsandtheincreasingroleofnationalelectorsduringthecrisisunequivocally
limitedthechanceofsystemicreformsinthedemocraticandfederalistdirection.Such
anoption-althoughthemostreasonableforsolvingeconomicproblems-became
theleastpracticableforpoliticalreasons(Matthijs,Blyth,2015:260;Legrain,2014;
Grosse,2015a).Changestointegrationprocessescanhardlybeseenasstrengthening
technocraticfederalism.Admittedly,anincreaseintheenforcementpowerswieldedby
theEUtechnocracyistobeobserved,butunderstricterintergovernmentalsupervision
andinlinewiththewillofthelargestMemberStates.Itmakesiteasyforthestrongest
ofthelattertodisciplinetheweaker,orthoseaffectedbybudgetarytroubles,byusing
Europeaninstruments.ItisonthisbasisthatIsuggestthatthetrendsinquestionshould
bedescribedasleadingtowardsanuasymmetricalconfederation,”11characterisedby
theunevendistributionofpowerbetweenthelargestcountries(andthestrongestin
economicterms),andtheweaker,smallerorperipherally-situatedones(Grosse,2016c).
AsymmetricalconfederationdenotesapoliticalhierarchybetweenEUcountries,which
alsoinvolvestheunequaldistributionofcostsandtheadvantagesofintegrationbetween
MemberStates.ThisconfirmsDavidMitrany’spresuppositionsthatthestrengthened
Europeanpoliticalcooperationwilltendtoencouragedominationbythestrongest
11Somescholarsrefertothatmodelasutheunionofasymmetricalstates.”Cf.Fabbrini,2014:59-70.
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