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Introduction.EuropeanPoliciesandChangeintheEUIntegrationModel
unionandthereinforcedsupervisionofbanksalsorelatesmostlytotheeuroarea.
AsstatedinapressreleasepublishedbytheCommission,thiswassupposedtobe
amilestoneintheprocessofdeepeningpoliticalintegrationwithintheMonetary
Union(EuropeanCommission,2012:2).TheremainingMemberStatesmayjoinit,
butunderasymmetricalconditions.Theymayacceptmostobligationsandsupervisory
decisionsoftheECB,buthavelimitedinfluenceonthedecision-makingprocess
(HowarthandQuaglia,2013:115).Suchconditionsstrengthentheinequalityofpolitical
powerbetweenthetwointegrationcirclesintheEU,forkeydecisionsmaybemadeby
thecentralcountriesbelongingtotheEMUandbasedontheirpoliticalandeconomic
interests.Forexample,theaforementionedMinisterofFinancefortheeuroareawould
bevestedwithsubstantialpowerswithrespecttothenationalbudgets-notonlywithin
theEurozone,butintheentireEU(FinancialTimes,2014a).
CooperationwithinthebankingunionandotherEurozoneinstitutionsmayhelp
consolidatepoliticalcooperationwithintheEMU.Scholarsagreethatthecrisisbrought
thesignificanceoftheeuroareaforfurthercooperationintheEuropeanUnioninto
sharpfocus,whichmayhaveafar-reachinginfluenceonotherpublicpoliciesandareas
ofdifferentiatedintegration(Ondarza,2013b;Leuffenetal.,2013:19;Schimmelfennig
andWinzen,2014:366).TheEurozonethusmarkstheborderbetweentheinnerand
outerintegrationcircletoaneverlargerextent,andsupportsapoliticalmodelbasedon
permanentpoliticalsegmentation(Ondarza,2013b).Simultaneously,withinthesaid
zone,thesixfoundingstatesoftheEuropeanCommunity,whicharenotsubjectto
differentiatedintegration,remainthemostpowerfulones(meaningthattheyalways
belongtotheEuropeanavant-garde).Thecrisisalsohighlightedtheleadingrole
ofthetwolargeststatesoftheeuroarea,i.e.GermanyandFrance(ibid.).Political
decisionsmadewithinthesaidpoliticalcoremaybeextendedtotheouterintegration
circlesubsequently,e.g.viaCommunitylegislation(Fabbrini,2015b:263).Thismay
notbetrueonlyofissuesrelatingtofinancialmarketsorthesinglemarket,butalso
tomanyotherpublicaffairs(Münchau,2012;OpenEurope,2012:4-6).Thiseffect
willbereinforcedbythevotingreformintheEUintergovernmentalinstitutions
undertheTreatyofLisbon,whichenteredintoforcein2014(Fabbrini,2015a:27)14.
Aspartofthenewsystem,theEMUcountrieshavethequalifiedmajorityinthese
EUinstitutions.Therefore,theLisbonvotingsystemandcloserintegrationwithin
theEurozonewillcertainlystrengthenthedecision-makingcapacityofEuropean
institutions,andthepoliticalinfluenceofthetwobiggestMemberStates.
Lastbutnotleast,weshouldturnourattentiontoonemorepossibleoutcome
oftheprocessofpoliticalsegmentation.IftheinstitutionalcapacityoftheEMUis
enhanced,itmaybeattheexpenseoftheEuropeanUnionasweknowit,whichmight
beumergedinto”theMonetaryUnion.ThismayhappentoEuropeaninstitutions,
14
Duringthetransitionalperioduntil2017,thepreviousvotingsystemmaybeuseduponasingle
MemberState’srequest.
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