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formalizedbymeansoflegalrules.Thus,itisinpreciselythiscontext
thattheremayariseaninterestingquestionofthechoicebetweenthe
ruleofproportionalityandtheTalmudicruleasanormativebasisfor
decidingsome‘distributivecontroversy’betweentheparticipantsof
thenegotiations.
Second,Perelmanwrotethatformaljusticeisa“commonelement”,
“commondenominator”ofvariousformulasofjustice;thatitcontains
“anindeterminateelement”,a“variable”(essentialcharacteristic,
essentialcategory)andgivesrise,after“determination”,tovarious
formulas(conceptions)of“particular”,“concrete”justice;that
material
(concrete,
particular)
justice
is
a
concretization,
“determination”offormaljustice.[18]Butthesestatementsare
misleading.Formaljusticeneedsaspecificationbutofadifferent
kindthantheonementionedbyPerelman.Materialjusticeis
aspecificationoftherequirementsuumcuiquetribuere,notof
concept1offormaljustice.Ingeneral,Perelmanconflatesheretwo
differentnotions:concept1offormaljustice,whichregulates
applicationofanyrules(notonlyformulasofmaterialjustice),and
abstractjustice(suumcuiquetribuere),whichisthecommonelement
offormulasofmaterialjustice.Thisconflationisaresultofthefact
thatPerelmandidnotdistinguishbetweentwodifferentconceptsof
formaljustice.
Third,theforegoingconsiderationsshowthatthefollowingviewof
Perelmanisimplausible:
Eneffet,ledroitpositifnepeutjamaisentrerenconflitaveclajustice
formelle,vuqu’ilnefaitquedéterminerlescatégoriesessentiellesdont
parlelajusticeformelle,etsansladéterminationdesquellesl’application
delajusticeesttoutàfaitimpossible.[19]
ContrarytoPerleman’sclaim,‘positivelaw’cancomeintoconflict
withconcept2offormaljusticeifitprovidesforsomeextravagant
wayofhandlingunequalcases(forsomepeople,suchawaymightbe
progressivetaxation;andformostpeople,penaltiesforcrimesnot
proportionaltotheirgravity).Accordingly,itistruethat‘positivelaw’
cannotcomeintoconflictwithconcept1offormaljusticebutthereis
adifferentwayofunderstandingformaljusticewhichcancomeinto
