Treść książki
Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
WojciechCharemza
AkademiaFinansówiBiznesuVistula
ORCID0000-0002-4748-2655
Centralbanks’votingcontest1
1.Introduction
Mostindependentcentralbanksdecideontheirmonetarypolicybyvoting
withinadecisionbodyusuallycalledthemonetarypolicycouncil(orboard,
orboardofgovernors,orsomethingsimilar),abbreviatedhereasMPC.The
theoryandpracticeofvotingasappliedincentralbankshasbeenafocusof
researchforsometime.Therecentliteratureconcentratesparticularlyonthe
predictivepowerofvotingrecords(seeHorvathandJonašova,2015),voting
transparency(GersbachandHahn,2009),theefficiencyandconsistencyof
votingschemes(GersbachandPachl,2009;Sosnowska,2013),thepredictability
ofvotingresults(Sirchenko,2011;RiboniandRuge-Murcia,2014;Horvath,
ŠmidkovaandZapal,2016)andothersuchtopics.
Thispaperfocusesontherathernarrow,andapparentlyunresearched,
topicofthevolatilityofthevotingalgorithmsappliedbydifferentcentral
banks.Itiswellknownthatoveractivemonetarypolicymightwellresult
indestabilisation(e.g.Akram,BärsdenandEithreim,2006;Charemzaand
Ladley,2016),whileaconstantlypassivepolicymightbenopolicyatall.It
shouldbestressedthatthispaperisnotaboutthetimingofmonetarydecisions
likeOliveiandTenreyro(2007)andChoi,EisenbachandYorulmazer(2016)
are.Ratheritconsiderscaseswheredifferentcentralbanksgiventhesame
setofextraneousinformationmighttakedifferentdecisionssolelybecause
ofdifferencesinthevotingschemestheyuse.Moreprecisely,itanalysestwo
interrelatedproblems:(i)howdifferentvotingalgorithms,likethoseusedin
1ThisresearchhasbeenfinancedbytheNationalScienceCentreinPoland,Opus8
project2018/29/B/HS4/01462,Constructionandtestingofcountry-specificmeasures
ofeconomicuncertainty.I’mgratefultoRobinHazlehurstandRyszardKokoszczyński
fortheirinsightfulcommentsandsuggestions.
