Old-Age Crisis and Pension Reform. Where do we stand?

Marek Szczepański

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ISBN/ISSN:

978-83-7775-254-8

DOI:

-

Wydawnictwo:

Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej

Rok wydania:

2013

Liczba stron:

223

XML:ISBN/ISSN:

Bibliografia:

Szczepański, Marek. Old-Age Crisis and Pension Reform. Where do we stand?. Red. . Poznań: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej, 2013, 223 s. ISBN 978-83-7775-254-8

Bibliografia refWorks:

RT Book, Whole

SR Electronic(1)

A1 Szczepański, M.

A2

T1 Old-Age Crisis and Pension Reform. Where do we stand?

PB Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej

PP Poznań

YR 2013

SN 978-83-7775-254-8

Bibliografia BibTex:

@Book{ 92083, author = "Szczepański, Marek", editor = "", title = "Old-Age Crisis and Pension Reform. Where do we stand?", publisher = "Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej", year = "2013", address = "Poznań", isbn = "978-83-7775-254-8" }

Bibliografia endNote:

TY - BOOK

AU - Szczepański, Marek

ED -

TI - Old-Age Crisis and Pension Reform. Where do we stand?

PB - Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej

CY - Poznań

PY - 2013

SN - 978-83-7775-254-8

ER -

Netografia (standard APA):

Szczepański, Marek. Old-Age Crisis and Pension Reform. Where do we stand? [baza danych online] Poznań: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej, 2013 [dostęp: 23 07 2024]. Dostęp w Ibuk Libra: https://libra.ibuk.pl/reader/old-age-crisis-and-pension-reform-where-do-we-stand-marek-szczepanski-92083.

fundusze emerytalne, emerytura, ubezpieczenia społeczne, kryzys finansowy

Monografie prezentują rezultaty badań wpływu globalnego kryzysu finansowego z lat 2008-2009 na funkcjonowanie i perspektywy rozwoju zakładowych systemów emerytalnych w Polsce i na świecie (w krajach Unii Europejskiej oraz w wybranych państwach poz...

ISBN/ISSN:

978-83-7775-254-8

DOI:

-

Wydawnictwo:

Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej

Rok wydania:

2013

Liczba stron:

223

XML:ISBN/ISSN:

Foreword6
Acknowledgments8
Przedmowa10
Part I. Implementation of Pension Reforms in European Countries12
1. GERARD HUGHES Have Personal Retirement Savings Accounts Achieved Their Objectives in Ireland?14
2. JIM STEWART The World Bank and Pension Reform: Some Current Issues32
3. GABRIELLA SJÖGREN LINDQUIST, ESKIL WADENSJÖ Income Distribution Among Those of 65 Years and Older in Sweden44
4. MARIA CLARA MURTEIRA The Reform of Pensions in Portugal: A Critical Assessment78
5. MACIEJ ŻUKOWSKI Pension Reforms in Poland and in Other CEE Countries 1998-2012100
6. JÁN ŠEBO TOMÁŠ VIRDZEK Political Risk and Pension Funds’ Performance – the Case of Slovakia108
7. ADAM SAMBORSKI Pension Funds Governance124
8. MAREK SZCZEPAŃSKI, TOMASZ BRZĘCZEK Risk Reform in Poland and the Efficiency of Occupational Pension Schemes140
Part II. Pension reforms in non-European countries156
9. JOHN A TURNER, DANA M MUIR. Financial Literacy and Financial Advice: Weak Links in Social Security Privatization158
10. ALBERTO M RAMÍREZ DE JURADO F., DENISE GÓMEZ—HERNÁNDEZ. Comparative Study of the Efficiency of Defined Contribution Pension Schemes in Continental America178
11. YI-FAN YANG, TAI-XI XIAO. Population Aging, Demographic Dividend and Raising the Retirement Age in China: Empirical Simulation and Policy Choice190
About the Authors216
About the European Network for Research on Supplementary Pensions (ENRSP)220
Spis treści222

16

GerardHughes

valueofthefundbyCornmarketGroupforanAVCforateacherishigherthanthe

annualchargeforastandardPRSA,thesourceoftheinformationforthisgroup,

Brady(2001a),pointedoutthattheywerecharging“atthetopendofwhatisnor-

malpracticeinthepensionsbusiness”.ChargesforastandardPRSAwerealso

higherthanchargesforaStakeholderPensionintheUKwhichwasintroducedin

2001twoyearsearlierthanthePRSA.TheonlychargeforaStakeholderPension

wasthe1percentannualmanagementfee

3.PRSAchargesarealsohigherthanthe

revisedmaximumchargesimposedin2010inHungaryonmandatoryandvolun-

taryprivatepensioninvestmentaccountsandonmandatoryaccountsinPolandin

2012.ThedeductionsfromcontributionsinIrelandarenearly40percentgreater

thaninPolandwhiletheannualmanagementfeesaretwo-thirdsgreater.Bothsets

ofchargesarefivetimesgreaterinIrelandthaninHungary.

WhydidthestandardPRSAturnouttobeahighercostproductthanenvisaged

bythePensionsBoard?Themainreasonappearstobethatthepensionproviders

werenotpreparedtoofferaPRSAatamuchlowercostthantheypreviously

chargedforapersonalpensionandtheywereabletoinsistonthisbecausethegov-

ernmentwasnotwillingtoofferthePRSAproductwithouttheirco-operation.

Duringthenegotiationsbetweenpensionprovidersandthegovernmentonthe

termsandconditionswhichwouldbeattachedtothenewPRSAproduct,financial

journalistsdiscoveredfromtheirownsourcesthattheproviderswereopposedto

akite-markedproductandthattheywereopposedtoanycapontheircharges.For

example,Kirby(2001)reportedinBusinessandFinancemagazinethat:

“Thepensioncompanieslobbiedhardagainstakite-markoramaxi-

mumcharge(theycertainlydidn’twantanythinglikethetotal1%

limitimposedonStakeholder,theUKversionofthePRSA)”.

Whatemergedeventuallyfromthenegotiationswasacompromiseunderwhich

theproviderswouldofferastandardPRSAwithchargesgenerallyhigherthanwas

usualforpreviouspersonalpensionproductsandnon-standardPRSAswhichal-

lowedtheproviderstolevyhigherchargesthanpreviouspersonalpensionprod-

ucts.InthesamearticleKirby(2001)wentontopointoutthat:

“Thenon-standardPRSAiscertainlyacompromise-awayforthe

pensioncompanies(whohavehadthismarkettothemselvesupto

now)toearnhighermarginsandtorewardtheircommission-paid

brokers”.

Subsequently,anotherjournalist,(Brady2001b)investigatingthenegotiations

betweenpensionprovidersandthegovernmentfoundaletterundertheFreedomof

InformationActfromtheIrishInsuranceFederationwhichwarnedthat:

3In2005theannualmanagementfeeforStakeholderPensionwasincreasedto1.5per

centforthefirsttenyearsafterwhichitfallsbackto1percent.