Treść książki
Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
1.TheForeignPolicyoftheSecondRepublicofPoland
17
theirreconcilableambitionsoftheEuropeanpowerslefttheLeagueinastateof
paralysis).ItwasPolandwhichinJuly1927putforwardadraftresolutionwhereby
memberstatesofLeaguewouldhaverenouncedwarfareasameansofresolving
disputes.Thoughrejectedatthetime,theideare-emergedintheKellogg–Briand
Pactadoptedayearlater.February1929inturnbroughtthesigningbyWarsawof
theLitvinovProtocol,thisimmediately(fromthemomentofsignature)introduc-
ingprincipleslaiddowninthePactintoallrelationsbetweenEasternEuropean
countries.
However,withtimePolandcametodoubtthesecurityguaranteestheLeague
ofNationscouldoffer,interaliathankstothewayinwhichtheOctober1925
LocarnoTreatyviolatedtheprinciple(albeitonlytheformalprinciple)regarding
equalsecurityofGermany,seasternandwesternneighbours,thewayGermany
usedtheforumprovidedbytheLeaguetoattackPolandoverits1934renounc-
ingoftheso-called"PolishMinorityTreaty”,and–ultimately–thewayinwhich
GermanywasabletojointheLeagueonthebasisofpermanentmembership(as
opposedtoPoland,ssemi-permanentstatus).
Themostdifficulttaskourdiplomacyfacedbackthenwastoensurethatboth
GermanyandtheSovietUnionkepttheirdistancefromPoland.Thisremained
relativelyeasyintheimmediateaftermathofWorldWarI,whenbothpowerswere
weakandisolated,butitcametobemoreandmoredifficultastimepassed.Afirst
"war”wagedbyGermanyagainstPolandcommencedin1925andlasteduntil
1934,ifonlyintheformofacustomsdispute.Onlyin1926diditprovepossi-
bletoconcludeanagreementregulatingcross-borderrelationsbetweenthetwo
countries.Paradoxically,thesigningofadeclarationonthenon-useofviolence
betweenthetwocountrieshadtowaituntilafterAdolfHitlerhadalreadycometo
power.Needlesstosay,Hitlerhadnointentionwhateverofrenouncingtheuseof
force,butitwasusefulforhimtocalmthesituationinthisway,toallaysuspicions
inorderthathemightdrawuphisplansforaggressionundisturbed.Ofcourse,it
wouldnotbetruetosaythatPolandgainednothingfromthis,sinceabreathing
spacewasatleastoffered,andachancetoseekremedialmeasures.Thefactthat
PiłsudskihadabsolutelynoillusionsregardingNaziGermany,sintentionsismade
clearbytheproposalheaddressedtoFranceregardingajointly-pursuedpreventa-
tiveconflictthatwasaimedatbringingdownHitler.Alas,labouringunderthefalse
senseofsecuritytheMaginotLineseemedtobeaffordingit,Francelackedthe
psychologicalmotivationtobecomeentangledinsuchahigh-costventure.2
WhererelationswiththeSovietUnionwereconcerned,aTreatyofRome
favourabletoPolandhadinitiallybroughtaboutaparticularkindofcessationof
hostilities.However,PolandonlyrecognisedtheUSSRinDecember1923.Two
yearslater,theSovietswereproposingtheconclusionwithPolandofanon-aggres-
2SeethebroadertreatmentofferedbyK.Mazurowain:Skazaninawojnę[Condemnedtowar],
WydawnictwoMON,Warsaw,1979.