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I.Poland’sForeignPolicyBefore1989
pointinthewholearrangementwasthattheAllieswereleftfreetodecidehow
Polishforcesmightbedeployed,anddidnotalwaysusetheminthemostsensible
manner.Inevitably,agovernment-in-exile,i.e.onebenefitingfromthehospitality
ofanotherstateorpower,isnottrulyabletopursueaforeignpolicyofitsown.
Allthatcouldthereforebeachievedwasamaintenanceoftieswithotherstates.
Naturally,enough,thegovernmenthaditsplatefullwithmattersofthewarand
Poland,sfutureoncethefightingwasover.Yetitscapacitytoinfluencethatpost-
warfatewasalmostentirelycompromisedfromtheoutset.Thereiscoldcomfort
intherecognitionthatthePolishauthoritieswerenotaloneinthis,since,through
policychoicestheythemselveshadmade,theWesternpowerswerealsovirtually
impotentinthisregard.ItwasStalinwhoheldthekeytoPoland,sfuture,forthe
simplereasonthathisEasternFrontwastodecidetheresultofWorldWarIIas
awhole,andhisarmywouldbetheonetoliberatePoland.
NotwithstandingtheSovietaggressionofSeptember1939againstit,Polandwas
neveractuallyinastateofwarwiththeUSSR.Indeed,assoonashostilitiesbetween
GermanyandtheSovietUnionerupted,ChurchillsetaboutconvincingSikorskithat
somenormalisingofrelationswithMoscowwasessential.Thus,30Julybrought
theconcludingoftheso-calledSikorski–Maysky5Agreement,byvirtueofwhich
diplomaticrelationswererestored,whiletheGerman-Sovietagreementsconcerning
PolandfromAugustandSeptember1939wereinvalidated.Furthersettlementsin
theAgreementprovidedfortheestablishmentofaPolishArmyofsomesix–seven
divisionsonSovietterritory,aswellasforthefreeingofmanythousandsofPoles
fromprisons,campsorplacesofinternalexile.Unfortunately,onaccountofthe
difficultiesexperiencedwithdeterminingthesaidarmy,sorganisationandtheways
inwhichitwastobeused,aswellasundertheinfluenceofBritishplottingtohave
thePolishforcesdeployedinprovidingreinforcementwithintheUK,sownsphere
ofinfluenceintheMiddleEast(inthefaceofGermanmilitaryexpansionthere),
whathadbecomeknownastheAndersArmylefttheUSSRinsummer1942.In
thatway,theLondon-basedgovernmentlostasignificantbargainingcounterinits
discussionswithMoscow.InMarch1943,GermanforcesintheKatynareauncov-
eredthemassgravesofPolishsoldiers,murdered–asitwouldsoonemerge–by
theNKVD.(Wenowknowthatinexcessof20,000losttheirlives,andthatforthe
mostparttheywerearmyofficers,plustheSecondRepublic,sadministrativeelite,
alltransferredoutoftheterritorytheUSSRoccupiedinSeptember1939.)Theorig-
inaldiscoveryledtoMoscow,sseveringofthe1941agreement,andtothebreaking
offoftieswiththeGovernment-in-ExileinApril1943.6Shortlythereafter,Stalin
setaboutforminghisowncentresofpowerforthepost-WarPoland,aswellas
5IvanMayskywasSovietambassadorinLondonbetween1932and1943.
6Moscowhadsoughttodothispreviouslyand,oncetheKatynMassacrehadbeenrevealed,the
pretextbecamethePolishrequestthattheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossexaminethegraves
theGermanshaddiscovered.SincetheGermansmadeasimilarapplication,Moscowhadperfectgrounds
forclaimingthatPolandandGermanywereactuallyactingincahootsagainsttheSovietUnion.