Treść książki

Przejdź do opcji czytnikaPrzejdź do nawigacjiPrzejdź do informacjiPrzejdź do stopki
2.TheExternalRelationsofthePeople’sRepublicofPoland
29
dialoguewithGermany,therebylimitingMoscow,sabilitytoplaytheGermancard
shouldtheprojectprovesuccessful.18
After1956,PolandwasabletostartdevelopingrelationswithWesternstates.
Agreathelpherewasthelegendof1956andof"thenationalcommunist”Władys-
ławGomułkahimself,onwhomonecouldcountwhenitcametoattemptstoloosen
thetiesbindingthecommunistbloctogether.Thiswasespeciallysointhewakeof
thebloodypacicationofHungaryin1956(anactionnotsupportedbyWarsaw),
aswellasinthelightofthereality(asperceivedbytheWest)thatnoalternative
candidatesfortherolewereanywhereinsight.ThepossibilityofanotherBroz-Tito
appearingseemedtobetakingshapeinPoland,whiletheremainingcountriesin
theblocweregovernedbycommunistsentirelydependentuponMoscow.
Inturn,fromWarsaw,sstandpoint,acertainopeninguptotheWest(including
throughthedevelopmentofcontactsatindividuallevel)wasdesignedtomakeit
easierforPolandtobegrantedcreditanddevelopcooperationinotherspheresof
economicrelations.
TheWesternperceptionofPolandastheonlycommunist-blocentityawayfrom
MoscowworthtalkingtowasalsoinvaluableinthewaythatitaffordedPolish
diplomacyacertainroomformanoeuvre,apauseforbreath,thatallowedforrela-
tiveindependencewhenitcametoissuesofsecondaryimportance.Theauthorities
inWarsawdidnotquestioneithertheunityoftheEasternblocorloyaltyvis-à-vis
theSovietUnion,buttheydidforexamplebegintostraybeyondthatblocwhen
chancestodevelopinterestingcontactswithWesterncountriesandwhatwasthen
termed"theThirdWorld”presentedthemselves.Leadingthewaywherecontacts
wereconcernedwasFrance,whichhadbroughtGeneraldeGaullebacktopowerin
1958.TheGeneralwasavaluablepartner,hehavingbeentherstleaderofaWestern
powertorecognisetheOder-NeisseLineasPoland,sborder.Furthermore,hewas
preparedtoquestionUSdominancewithinWesternEuropeandtheNorthAtlantic
Alliance.However,thedevelopmentoftherelationswithFrancethensoimportant
toPolanddidnotmeetdeGaulle,sexpectations,sinceGomułka,sWarsawdidnot
wanttobedrawnintotheformer,sdiscreetstrategyforlooseningthetiesbinding
themonolithiccommunistblocandhencebreakingdownthedivisionofEurope.19
LeavingasidethelimitationsoriginatinginMoscoworthedogmaticnature
ofGomułkaandhiscronies,theprincipalobstacletoanybolderopeningup
totheWestuptothe1960swas"theGermanproblem”,i.e.therecognitionof
Poland,swesternborderbytheFederalRepublicofGermanyandhencethelatter,s
renouncementofanyandallterritorialclaimsatthattimeandinthefuture.The
18P.Wandycz,"Polskawstosunkach…”,ascitedabove.
19DeGaullesetgreatstorebyPolandwhenitcametohisstrategy,sinceheregardedthecountryas
oneofthe"historicalnations”,uponwhichanarticialandimpermanentpoliticalandeconomicsystem
hadbeenimposed.DuringhisSeptember1967visittoWarsaw,heproposedGomułkafollowtheFrench
examplesomethingthelattermainlyrejectedbecauseoftheGermanfactor(specicallytheneedto
retainclosetieswithMoscowoutoffearoftheGermans).