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I.Poland’sForeignPolicyBefore1989
1950agreementofthiskindenteredintowiththeGDRwasviewedasvalueless
eveninWarsaw,whiletheFederalRepublichad,fromitsrstmomentinexist-
encein1949,adheredtothepositionthatnalregulationofmattersterritorial
couldonlytakeplaceoncetheGermanieshadreunited.Thus,theGermanproblem
(initsdimensionsrelatingtoborders,possiblereunicationandGermany,smili-
tarystatus)becamesomethingofanobsessionforGomułka,limitinghisroomfor
manoeuvreinexternalrelations.
FacedwiththeimpossibilityofanywiderdevelopmentofcontactswiththeWest
(whichwasalliedwithWestGermanyafterall),thePeople,sRepublicofPoland
forgedsomereallyquiteinterestinglinkswithanumberofThird-Worldcountries.
ThiswasalsoinlinewithEastern-blocdoctrine,the"ghtagainstimperialism”
demandingthatalliesbesoughtinthedevelopingworld.Havingrecentlygained
theirindependenceafteryearsofcolonialism,suchcountrieswerethemselveson
thelookoutforrelationshipsotherthanthosewiththeformermasters.Moreseri-
ously,manywerequitereadytoadoptroutestodevelopmentotherthanthemarket
economy-anddemocracy-based.TheSovietUnionanditsalliesweremorethan
readytostepintothatvoidwithpolitical,strategicandsometimeseveneconomic
aid,andinthiswaythosecommunistbloccountriessuccessfullyavoidedisolation
internationally.AsaThirdWorldidentitybegantoemerge,theSovietspherecould
nowbegintocarryvotesattheUnitedNations(inessencethemachineryoftheUN
votingsystempassedoutofWashington,shandsandintothoseofMoscowatthat
time).CountrieslikePolandwerestaunchsupportersofthedecolonisationproc-
ess,andoncethiswascompletetheyactivelycultivatedrelationswithquitealarge
numberofAsian,AfricanandLatinAmericancountries,joiningthemincreating
aunitedfrontagainst"imperialistaggression”(rstinNorthKorea,thenCuba,
Palestine,Vietnam,etc.).Thustherelativelyrichandvariedpolitical,economic,
educationalandmilitaryrelationswiththisgroupofcountriesformedanimpor-
tantpartofwhatpassedforaforeignpolicyinthepost-1956People,sRepublicof
Poland.20
Overall,thosepost-1956relationscanbesaidtohavetakenshapebyreference
toathree-itemcanon.Obviouslytheaspectofmostfundamentalsignicancetook
inbilateralcontactswiththeUSSRitself,aswellasthosesubsistingwithinthe
communistbloc(or"community”).Theywereboundbyasetofspecicinterna-
tionalrelationsprinciplesholdingswaybackthenandentailingsocialistinterna-
tionalismandcooperation,aswellasmutualassistance,andtheywereofcourse
mainlyconditionedbyloyaltytotheSovietUnionandbythefactthatthecollective
interestwasdeemedtosupersedetheinterestsofindividualnations.
Infact,thekeyfeatureunderpinningrelationsbetweencommuniststateswas
thatonecountry,spartyinteractedwithanother(theofcialvisitsthattookplace
wereeventermed"party-statevisits”).Keydealswereclinchedthroughsuchinter-
20Seebroadertreatmentin:J.ZającandR.Zięba,op.cit.,p.194ff.