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20
RobertoRabel,KieranIreland
toexploittheirpowerdisparitiestoexactconcessions.
49
AtatimewhentheUnitedStates
ispursuingatransactionalforeignpolicyandChinaisdeterminedtomobiliseitswealth
inpursuitofitsself-interest,thisneedisincreasinglyacute.50
Second,lackofleadershipfromwithinpreventsconvincingarticulationofacoherent
narrativeofASEAN’swantsandneeds.AsSuosYarawrites,4ASEANcentralitycannot
besustainedifthereisnotunityorsolidarity’.51Here,concernscentreuponIndonesia,
wherecallsfora4post-ASEANforeignpolicy’reflectPresidentWidodo’sde-emphasising
ofASEANastheavenuethroughwhichJakartashouldassertitspositionattheAsia-Pacific
level.52Furthermore,PhilippinesPresidentRodrigoDuterte’stransactionalwillingness
tosetasideManila’sterritorialdisputewithBeijinginreturnfortheeconomicbenefits
ofacloserbilateralrelationshipandhisexpressedpreferenceforbilateralresolutionsto
thedisputehavestokedconcernsthatManilawillkeeptheissueoffASEAN’sagenda.
TheriskthereforearisesthatASEAN4couldfinditselfcompletelyside-linedinthebiggest
securitychallengeinSoutheastAsia’,condemningittoirrelevance.53
ASEAN’sall-importantelites,totheircredit,havebeguntospeakonthematter
ofpreservingexternalcentrality.AtaMarch2017roundtableinKualaLumpur,concerns
werevoicedthatAmericanretrenchmentfromSoutheastAsiawouldfurtherweaken
ASEANcentralitybydrivingmemberstatesintoBeijing’sembrace.
54
Additionally,
many-includingcurrentandformerheadsofstateandforeignministersfromSingapore,
Indonesia,andMalaysia-haveadvocatedthatASEANengageininternalreformsandrevisit
theprincipleofconsensus-baseddecision-makingbyseparatingconsensusfromunanimity.
The4ASEAN-X’modelwouldallowtheorganisationtotakeactionovertheobjections
ofanyonemember,inaproposalrespondingprimarilytoBeijing’suseofCambodiaas
aproxytopreventembarrassingcensuresofChinaforitsactionsintheSouthChinaSea.
55
Theideaisnotasradicalasitmayseematfirstblush.Bypreservingconsensusas
anidealwhileacceptingtheimpracticalityofunanimity,ASEANwouldgainmuch-
neededflexibilityinrespondingtotherealitiesofachangingregion.56TheASEAN-X
49
W.Tow,op.cit.,p.19.
50
C.Kahl,H.Brands,4Trump’sGrandStrategicTrainWreck’,ForeignPolicy,31January2017,http://
foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/31/trumps-grand-strategic-train-wreck/(accessedon15April2017).
51
S.Yara,4ThewayforwardfortheASEANCommunity’,EastAsiaForum,12May2017,http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2017/05/12/the-way-forward-for-the-asean-community/(accessedon17May2017).
52
M.Davies,4ASEANcentrality…’,op.cit.
53
R.JavadHeydarian,4UnderDuterte,ASEANCouldCedeCloutforConsensus’,AsiaMaritime
TransparencyInstitute,7March2017,https://amti.csis.org/duterte-asean-cede-clout/(accessedon11May
2017).
54
T.Patel,4ATradeWarisUnlikelybutStableUS-ChinaRelationsareCrucialforASEAN’,CIMB
ASEANResearchInstitute,3April2017,http://www.cariasean.org/news/asean-roundtable-series-a-chang-
ing-world-order-what-will-president-trumps-economic-and-foreign-policies-mean-for-asean/(accessedon
25May2017).
55
D.K.Emmerson,4ASEANbetweenChinaandAmerica…’,op.cit.,pp.18-19.
56
4TheFutureofASEAN:MeetingtheChallengesofaChangingGlobalandRegionalLandscape’,
AMemorandumpresentedtoASEANForeignMinistersandLeadersbytheASEANInstitutesofStrategic
andInternationalStudies(ASEAN-ISIS),19February2017,p.7.
