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RobertoRabel,KieranIreland
Currently,theriskloomsthatthegreatpowers’respectivegoalswilloutweightheir
incentivestoengagewithoneanotherthroughthoseinstitutionsortocontinuepaying
lipservicetothenotionofASEANcentrality.Alreadythemoredirect,transactional
approachesofthegreatpowerstowardsoneanotherhavegeneratedalarmconcerning
thevitalityoftheregionalinstitutionsASEANhasestablishedtofacilitatearules-
basedorder.ThefirstmeetingbetweenPresidentsDonaldTrumpandXiJinping
inApril2017wasastrictlybilateralaffair,despitethebroadambitofthetwoleaders’
discussions,raisingfearsfortherelevanceoftheASEANRegionalForum.38ASEAN
effectivelyrequiresreassurancesfrombothsides:commitmentbytheAmericansnotto
abandonSoutheastAsia,andassurancefromChinathatitsgrowingregionalpresence
isnon-threatening.39
ThepivotalissueisthebroadergeopoliticalcompetitionbetweenWashingtonand
Beijing.Whereinternaldisputesintersectwiththeirrespectivewishes,complications
arise.TheSouthChinaSeadisputehasbeenthemostvisibleaspectofamultifaceted
competitionforinfluence,relativeadvantageandnationalprestigeintheregion,with
ASEAN’sinternalissues-itsinabilitytoreachaconsensusasseveralmembersnurture
territorialdisputes-intersectingwiththeSouthChinaSea’splaceinBeijing’sand
Washington’sdesiredregionalorder.
ChineseaimsforSoutheastAsiafocusonmaximisingitseconomicandstrategic
advantage,includingdominionoverthedisputedterritoriesoftheSouthChinaSea.It
haspursuedthisgoalinpartbypressuringCambodiatopreventASEANfromformally
respondingtoChineseactionsintheregion.
40
Since2012,Cambodiahashampered
attemptsbyASEANstatesfeelingthreatenedbyChinatoissuejointcommuniques
acknowledgingtheissueatARFmeetings,withthe2016meetinginVientianeonly
narrowlypassinga(carefullysanitised)jointstatement.41ASEAN’ssearchforsecurity
hasconsequentlybeencriticisedas4fruitless’becauseconsensus-baseddecision-making
preventsitfromengagingmeaningfullywithChinaovertheissue.
42
Americangoals
inthedispute,ontheotherhand,inclinetowardsprotectingthestatusquo;evenacontested
SouthChinaSeaispreferabletoaChinese-controlledone.
ChineseandAmericanapproachesinrecentyearsinvitepessimismconcerningtheir
regardforASEAN.AsDonaldEmmersonhasnoted,China’sexploitationofthebilateral
relationshipwithCambodiatofrustrateaunanimousASEANpositionontheSouthChina
38
A.Ward,4Trump-XiMeetingShowsAsiaIsMovingintoaNewEra’,ChathamHouse,10April2017,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/trump-xi-meeting-shows-asia-moving-new-era(accessedon
5May2017).
39
D.K.Emmerson,4ASEANBetweenChinaandAmerica…’,op.cit.,p.8.
40
M.Davies,4ASEAN’sSouthChinaSeaulcer’,NewMandala,26July2016,http://www.newmandala.
org/aseans-south-china-sea-ulcer/(accessedon9August2017).
41
E.Laksmana,4CantherebeASEANcentralitywithoutunity?’JakartaPost,6September2016,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2016/09/06/insight-can-there-be-asean-centrality-without-unity.html
(accessedon30April2017).
42
M.Davies,4ASEAN’sSouth…’,op.cit.