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JerzyStelmach
however,weformulatenormativetheses(arguments)whichweexplain(orjus-
tify)byappealingtocriteriaotherthantruthsuchasrationality,justice,valid-
ity,credibility,importanceoreffectiveness.1Asaresult,thereisnoeasyway
betweenthesetwodiscourses.Thustocommentononeofthemostfundamental
argumentsonthesubjectofrelationsbetweenexistenceandobligationofcourse
hasnosense.Itis,however,unarguablethattheredoesnotexistanyunam-
biguous,widelyacceptedsolutiontothisissue.Naturally,scientificdiscourse
insomewaylimitsthepotentialbordersandcontentwhichcanbeutilisedin
practicaldiscourse.Certainly,however,itisnotthecasethatwemayintroduce
anystatementregardedastruewiththehelpoflogicalmeansinanykindof
ethicalthesisorargument.Itisnotsobecauseitcannotbeso.Ifweconsiderit
fromtheotherside,wealsohavetherighttostatethatpracticaldiscoursemay
have(andusuallydoeshave)somekindofinfluenceontheoreticaldiscourse,on
itscomposition,limitsandtheorderofthediscussionofproblemswhilst,atthe
sametime,itmaynotexaggeratethetruthofstatementsproducedwithinthe
realmoftheoreticaldiscourse.
Whetherwewanttoornot,wehavetolearntolivewiththisdualism.We
shouldseekacompromise,abalancingpoint,fromwhichbothcontexts–the
findingsofscienceandtheethicalbasis–maybereconciled.Inanepistemo-
logicalsense,bioethicsisthusakindofhybridwhichusesbothscientificstate-
mentsandethicalarguments.Recognising,therefore,thatitonlyoneofthese
discourse,szlogics,canbeusedinanywaydoesnotsolveourbioethicaldilemma
whichmanifestsitselfwherescientificandethicalreflectionsmeet.Finally,it
isacoursewhichiscompletelyincorrect,althoughfrequentlyfollowed,togrant
scientificstatementsanormativesensejustasitistoseekascientificbasisfor
normativearguments.Byutilisingakindofpretenceofunitywearethusable
tofillanontologicalandepistemologicalvoid.
3.Don’tweknowhowtoconstructanadequatetheoryofbioethics?
Anuntoldnumberof"bioethicaltheories”donotfulfilthecriteriaofadequa-
cy.Suchtheoriessimply"exist”alongsideoneanothernothavingany"common
ground”onwhichtheyareabletocompare,assessandimplementanykindof
criteriaofadequacyacceptedbyparticipantsinbioethicaldiscourse.Thisoccurs
because,untilthispoint,ithasnotbeenpossibletocreateauniversal"bioethical
dictionary”whichdefinesthebasicnotionsofthesubject.Theoreticaldiscourse
(scientific)affordsusmanydefinitionsofconcepts–importantfromthepointof
viewofbioethics–whichclaimtobesuccinct.However,theverydefinitionsof
thesenotions(e.g.ofmankind,humannatureorlifeinandofitself)differwidely
fromoneanotherdependingontheareaofscienceinwhichtheyareformulated
andtheconcrete(asIhavetermedit"activebioethics”)examplesinwhichthey
feature.Ifitisnotenoughthatwedonothaveatourdisposalevenonedefinition
1SeeJ.Stelmach,DieGrenzenderjuristischenErkenntnis[in:]FestschriftfürHorstKonzen,
MohrSiebeck,2006,p.894.
