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JaroslavVostatek
–Publicpensions(“publicsocialsecuritysystem”);
•Pillar1:pay-as-you-goscheme,
•Pillar1bis:mandatoryprivatefullyfundedpensionschemes,
–Mandatory/voluntaryoccupationalpensions(Pillar2);
–Voluntarypersonal(private)pensions(Pillar3).
TheEUclassificationtriestointegrateneo-liberallyconceived“second”pillars
inpost-Communistcountriesasan“auxiliaryalternativeB”topublicpensions,
whereasthekeydifferenceoftheinsuranceandsolidaritypublicpensionpillarsis
ignored.Bothmaybeexplainedbysignificantdifferencesinthepensionsystems
ofindividualEUcountries.TheEUclassificationdoesnotaspireforanormatively
conceivedpensiondesign;thepracticalpositivesignificanceofthesaidclassifica-
tion“only”consistsinthefactthatitrepresentsreasonsforintegratingcontribu-
tionsformandatoryprivatepensionswithinsocialsecuritycontributions–inthe
statistics.
Mandatoryprivatepensionsormandatoryprivatepensionsavings,asappropri-
ate,haveafundamentalpositioninthe1994neoliberalpensionmodeloftheWorld
Bank.Theoriginalneoliberaltheorycalledformandatoryparticipationofemploy-
eesinprivatepensioninsuranceunderconditionsinequanon.Inthisrespect,the
WorldBankstudyonlystatedthatlong-termsavings–inspiteofpreferentialtax
treatmentinmanycountries–arerelativelysmallcomparedtootherold-agein-
comes.Moreover,mosttaxbenefitswenttohigh-incomehouseholds,ofwhich
manywouldhavesavedevenwithoutsuchbenefits[Jamesetal.1994].However,
politiciansbehaveddifferently;inmajorityoftherelevantcountries–startingwith
Chile(1981)–theyactuallydemonstratedthatthenewdesignisbeneficial,with
optionalenrolmentinthesystemformostemployees;however,withoutthepossi-
bilitytoreturntothepublicpillar.Manyneoliberalpoliticianscertainlybelieved
this.Othersweresurelypulledbytheprivatesector;letusremindashortessay
ridiculingpensionreformdecisionmakinginanamelesscountry,apparentlyChile
[Kotlikoff2008].Inseveralcountries,politicianstriedtoconsiderinvestmentrisks
bymakingtheenrolmentmandatoryforyoungergenerationsonly;theyeven
bannedoldergenerations(46+years)fromenrollinginRomania.
Inthecontextofpredominantpracticeinanumberofcountries,itisusefulto
expandtheneoliberalpensiondesignbyanalternative:softcompulsion.Without
doubt,theopt-outsystem,whereaninsuredpersonmayopt-outofthepublicsys-
tem(eitherfullyorpartially)andopt-inaspecialprivatepensionpillar,forlifeand
withoutthepossibilitytoreturn,representsanalternative.Chileisanidealexam-
ple,withopt-outbeingcompletefromtwodifferentperspectivesatonce:aclient
didnotremainintheabandonedsocialinsurancepillar,notevenpartially,and
uponconversionreceivedsome“surrendervalue”forpreviousparticipationinthe
publicpillar.Wedisregardraresystems,whereclientsmaytemporarilyorperma-
nentlyconvertbetweenpublicandprivatesystems;theconversiondoesnotmake
anysense–intermsofamodel.Anopt-out,basedontheaforementionedconcept,
isviewedasmeansofmandatingprivatepensionsaving.Ontheotherhand,quasi-
