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Introduction.EuropeanPoliciesandChangeintheEUIntegrationModel
MemberStates(orthoseinmostneedofaid),theCommissionassumedtheroleofan
institutiondiscipliningthosecountries.SuchachangeintheroleoftheCommission
maybeindicativeofthereducedautonomyofthesaidinstitution,anditsinformal
subordinationtothewillofthestrongestEUMemberStates.
20Whatkindofanintegrationmodelemergedduringthecrisis?
EvenbeforethecrisisintheEurozone,twosystemictrendshadbeenemerging
intheEU.Thefirstentailedagradualincreaseinthepoliticalroleoftechnocratic
andjudicialinstitutions,basedontheCommunitymethod
8
andthedevelopment
ofutheregulatorysystem”inEurope,andthusthegrowingimpactofEUlawand
theauthorityofEuropeancourts(Majone,1996).Theprincipleofthesupremacy
(primacy)ofEUlawovernationallegislationwasofkeyimportance.Accordingto
scholars,itwasinspiredbytheconstitutionalsystemoffederalstates,whichnormally
featureahierarchybetweenfederalandnationallaw(Phelan,2011).Intheafore-
mentionedstates,constitutionalcourtssafeguardtheintegrityandfundamentalrights
oftheentirefederalpoliticalcommunity.InthecaseoftheEU,though,thereisneither
apoliticalcommunityattheEUlevel,norafederalstateofestablisheddemocratic
institutions.Therefore,theprincipleofsupremacyintroducedthefederalsystemin
Europewithregardtotheregulatoryandjudicialframework,butdidsowithoutany
shiftingofpoliticalpowertotheEUlevel,incompliancewithfundamentaldemocratic
principles.Inactuality,itshiftedpowerawayfromdemocraticnationalcommunities
andtheirrepresentativeselectedbypopularvotetotechnocraticandjudicialinstitutions
intheEU,whichdonotpossessdemocraticlegitimacy.Itwasasignificantsystemic
trend,whichmadeEuropeuatechnocraticfederation.”
Thesecond,oppositesystemictrendthatbecameapparentbeforethecrisiswas
thereluctanceoftheMemberStatestodelegatefurtherpowerstoEuropeaninstitutions,
andespeciallytotheCommission.Theaimwasalsotoweakentheaforementioned
Communitymethod,basedonthedevelopmentofEUlawandtheincreasingauthority
oftheCommission(withitslegislativeinitiative)andtheCourtofJusticeoftheEU
(withitspowersregardingthefinalinterpretationofEuropeanUnionlaw).Itisworth
mentioningthattheOpenMethodofCoordinationwaspreviouslymeanttobean
attempttoimprovegovernancethatwouldnotrequiredelegationofpowerstoEuropean
institutions,andwouldthusbecarriedoutwithoutanystrengtheningoftheirpowerover
theMemberStates(HodsonandMaher,2001;LeisinkandHyman,2005;Schäfer,2004).
8TheCommunitymethodreferstodecisionmakingprocessesintheEUwhichemphasisetherolesof
thesupranationaldecisionmakingbodies,suchastheCommission,theEPandtheCourtofJusticeofthe
EU.Itcanbecontrastedwithintergovernmentaldecisionmakingprocessesusedintheformer(pre-Lisbon
Treaty)SecondandThirdPillarsoftheUnion,inwhichtheCommissionandParliamentplayedmoreminor
roles;aswellastointergovernmentalcooperationoutsidetheformalEUprocesses,suchastheSchengen
Agreement(intheperiodbeforetheAmsterdamTreaty).
17