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INTRODUCTION
Thisbookhasatwo-levelstructure.Itscentralpartisacasestudyofacogni-
tiveapproachtotherepresentationoflexical“senses”,whichissometimescalled
“prototypesemantics”(cf.Kleiber2003[1990]).Thisinitialdelimitationofthe
“object”ofinvestigationmeritssomecomment.
Thelabel“prototypesemantics”serveswellasasignofoppositiontoprevi-
ous,moreopenlystructuralist1approachestotherepresentationoflexicalsenses.
Itis,however,potentiallytroublesomeinrespectofbothitssegments.Whileone
mayreadthelabel’smeaningas“anapplicationoftheprototypetheoryofcat-
egorizationtosemanticissues”,itisnotobviousthatonecancogentlytalkabout
theprototypetheory.Whatisbeyonddisputeistheexistenceofprototypeef-
fects,whichmayhaverelevanceforpsychologicaltheoriesofconcepts.2Moreo-
ver,thenotionof“prototype”asusedincognitivepsychology(seesection0.2.
below)neednotplaythecentralroleinthelinguisticstudylabelled“prototype
semantics”.Thereareotherfeaturesof“prototypephenomena”whichmaybeas
importantinlanguagestudyasthenotionof“prototype”itself,i.e.gradedand
nondiscreteaspectsoflinguisticcategories,or“familyresemblances”between
theirmembers.Inshort,psychological“prototypeeffects”couldbeonlyasug-
gestiveanalogytosomelinguisticallyrelevantphenomena.3
Thelabelcanbealsomisleadingasconcernsthe“semantics”segment.Asun-
derstoodtraditionally,“semantics”iscentrallyopposedtosyntaxandpragmatics.
However,incognitivelinguistics(CL,furtherusedalsoasanadjective),which
1IamhintinghereatcomplexrelationsbetweenthedescendantsofSaussure’sstructuralism
(neostructuralists,generativistsandcognitivelinguists).Thishistoricalissuewillbeformulatedbe-
lowandwillconstituteasignicantelementinmyconclusions(see5.2.).
2ThisisthepositionofEleanorRoschthefounderoftheprototypeapproachinpsychology.
InLehrer’ssummary,Rosch“arguesthatthenotionofprototypedoesnotinitselfconstituteatheory.
Sheclaimsonlythatanytheoryofconceptsmustbeconsistentwithwhatisknownaboutprototypes”
(Lehrer1990:381,note1).LakofftracesanevolutioninRosch’sviewonthismatteraspointed
outbyVandeloise(1990:409),reectingratherhisownchangesofviewthanhersbutfaithfully
reportsherpositionthatprototypeeffectsdonotconstituteatheoryofcategorization.Nevertheless,
heclaimssimultaneouslythatRosch“launchedageneralchallengetotheclassicaltheory”(Lakoff
1987:42–45),thusgivingsubstancetoVandeloise’scharge.
3Thisgeneralstatementpointstoacomplexofentangledissuescentralfor“prototypeseman-
tics”,concerningtherelationsbetweengoalsofpsychologistsandlinguists(theroleoflinguistic
evidenceinventuresofdifferentkind;thepossibilityoftransferringor“generalizing”datafrom
oneresearchcontexttoanother;ultimately,thestatusofbothdisciplinesortheirmutualrelation-
ship).Itisenoughtopointouthereapeculiarroleofwordsinpsychologicalexperiments:“proto-
typeeffects”studiedbyRoschandothersareelicitedwhenwordsaretreatedasliststobeordered
accordingtosomeabstractcriterion(e.g.whatisabetterexampleofatype?)ratherthanasusedin
communication.