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notcreationoflife-threateningrisks.Athirdpartyencountersthehighwaymanand
thepasser-bybeforethetransactionisconsummatedandofferstorescuethepasser-
byforallhismoney,lessonedollar.Orasimilarsituationoccursbetweenthecaptain
ofafounderingshipandarescuingtugonthestormysea.(3)Thedrywellscase:ex-
ploitationbutnotcreationoflife-threateningriskswithonesupplierandmanybid-
ders.InaremoteruralareaallwellsexceptfromA’sdryupinadroughtandAauc-
tionsoffdrinkingwatertodesperateinhabitantsforlargepercentagesoftheirwealth.
Orimaginethemaritimerescuesituationin(3)withseveralshipsandonerescuer.
(4)ThePennyBlackcase:exploitationbutnotcreationofnon-life-threateningsitua-
tions.Acomesacrossararestampinhisaunt’satticandsellsittoacollectorB,exploit-
inghisidiosyncraticallyintensepreferences.Alternatively,hesellsittothehighestbid-
derthroughaSotheby’sauction.(5)Thelecherousmillionairecase.Aagreestopayfor
acostlymedicaltreatmentofB’schild(oroffersBanacademicpositionorapromo-
tioninthefirm)inreturnforB’ssexualfavours.(6)Thecartelizedautoindustrycase:
contrivedmonopolies.Majorautomobilemanufacturersformacarteltocurtaildras-
ticallyconsumers’legalrightswithrespecttopersonalinjuries.(7)Thesinglemoth-
eronwelfarecase:non-monopolizednecessity.ApersoninnecessityAcontractswith
Bwholacksmonopolybutthetermsofthedeal(highrisksandlowreturn)areespe-
ciallyburdensometoA.
Ineconomictheorythetermmostcommonlyusedtocaptureproblemsofthiskind
isholdup.InarecentpaperStevenShavellarguesthatbesidesinformationasymmetry
andexternalitiesholdupsituationsprovideathirdgeneraleconomicjustificationfor
limitingfreedomofcontract(Shavell,2007).Fromaneconomicperspectiveduress,res-
cue,usuryandcontractmodificationareallsituationswithapotentialforholdup,i.e.
onepartyopportunisticallytakesadvantageoftheother(Muris,1981).
Ourfocusinthispaperissomewhatnarrower.First,weareonlydealingwithfresh
contractsandnotwithcontractmodification.Thereasonforthisisthatalthoughthe
underlyingeconomicissuesaresimilar,boththecontractualtechniquesavailableand
thelegaldoctrinesregulatingcontractmodificationsignificantlydifferinthesetwo
cases.3Second,inoureconomicmodelwedonotdiscusscoercion(duress),i.e.cas-
eswhenonepartyforcesorthreatenstheotherintoacontractbycreatingasituation
wheretheotherhastochoosebetweentwoevils(Cserne2010).Althoughduressrais-
esquestionswhichareworthdiscussingfromaneconomicperspective,themodelwe
developinsection3isonlyconcernedwith“direconstraint[s]imposedontheprom-
isorbysomeoneelsethanthepromisee”(Cooter,Ulen,2008:p.286).4Fromaneco-
nomicperspective,thepolicyobjectiveinregulatingnecessityistogiveoptimalincen-
tivesforprecaution,searchandrescue.Underthisview,animportantcharacteristicof
necessitycasesisthat,incontrasttoduress,bothpartieshaveaninterestinupholding
3
Thelawandeconomicsliteratureoncontractmodificationisvoluminous.See,e.g.(Aivazian,Trebil-
cock,Penny,1984),(Graham,Pierce,1989),(Jolls,1997).
4ThisisthewayCooterandUlendefinenecessityintheirtextbook,contrastingitwithduresswhich
“concernsadireconstraintimposedonthepromisorbythepromisee”(Cooter,Ulen,2008:p.286).Tonote,
thisdualityofduressandnecessityroughlycorrespondstoStevenShavell’sdistinctionbetweenengineered
andnon-engineeredholdup(Shavell,2007:pp.225-226).ThefirstreferstothecasewhenAcreatesan
opportunityforhimselftoexploitB.Inthesecondcase,Adoesnotcreatebutonlyusesthenecessityof
B.Instillotherterms,theoriginofthediresituationcanbeendogenous(duress)orexogenous(necessity)
(Bar-Gill,Ben-Shahar,2005).
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