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14
RobertoRabel,KieranIreland
andnotintrudingintotheirsocietiestoodeeply.15Simplyput,ASEAN’slegitimacyis
congruentwithitsmaterialutility:itselitesandcitizensgaugeitsvaluebythebenefits
theyderivefromASEAN’sexistence,particularlythoseassociatedwitheconomicand
politicalstabilityintheregion.Indeed,muchofASEAN’slegitimacyhashistorically
arisenfromprovidingaformofmutualcollectivesecuritythathaspreventedconflict
amongstitsownconstituentstates.
16
Whileunusualinnotseekingprimarilytoprotectits
membersagainstexternalpowers,thisachievementisaprofoundlyliberaloneinterms
ofcooperationamongstnation-statestoachievegreatercollectivesecurity.
ASEANisoftencharacterisedasanelite-drivenproject,withaprimarilynarrow
economicfocus-asnotedbyseveralpoliticalandbusinessleadersatthe2017World
EconomicForummeetinginDavos.
17
Forelites,ASEAN’sutilityismostapparent4when
itdemonstratesitsvalue’byenhancingtheirwealthandsovereignty,butthereislittle
inASEAN’srecentrecordofaccomplishmenttoimpresselites.
18
TheASEANEconomic
Communitystilllacksvigour,whileinsecuritypersistsintheSouthChinaSea,where
growingdissenthasemergedwithintheorganisationoverwhetheritsconsensus-based
decision-makingmodelcangenerateeffectiveresponsestotheissue.19Severalformer
foreignministersfromstatesincludingIndonesia,Malaysia,Vietnam,andthePhilippines
havearguedforre-examinationorreinvigorationoftheconsensusmodel,withIndonesia’s
HassanWirajudaarguingthat:4[o]nememberstateshouldnotpreventothersfrom
implementingtheirmutuallyagreeddecisions’.20
Atthesametime,ASEAN’shistoricallyinformalstructuremeanselitesarewary
ofcedingmorethantokenamountsofsovereignty,particularlyifthiscouldendanger
theirowndomesticpower.Nationalisticelementspresentafurthercomplication,with
populistsharnessingeconomicnationalisminserviceoftheirdomesticagendas-as
evidencedinIndonesia’spresidentialelectionwherepowerfulsectorialinterestssupported
PrabowoSubianto’spopulistcampaign.21ThisintertwineswithASEAN’slegitimacyat
thedomesticlevel,whereeliteshavejustifiedASEANtotheircitizenriesbyhighlighting
15
Anonymous,4TheEUasaTemplateforRegionalIntegration:theCaseofASEAN’,TheYoung
Diplomat,21April2017,http://www.young-diplomat.com/single-post/2017/04/21/The-EU-as-a-template-
for-regional-integration-the-case-of-ASEAN(accessedon5June2017).
16
R.Emmers,4EnduringMistrustandConflictManagementinSoutheastAsia:AnAssessmentofASEAN
asaSecurityCommunity’,TRaNS:Trans-RegionalandNationalStudiesofSoutheastAsia,January2017,
Vol.5,No.1,p.83.
17
M.Singh,4ManufacturingIdentity:IsASEANaCommunityYet?’,WorldEconomicForum,27January
2017,https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/manufacturing-identity-is-asean-a-community-yet/(accessed
on13July2017).
18
M.Davies,4ASEANcentralitylosingground’,EastAsiaForum,4September2016,http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2016/09/04/asean-centrality-losing-ground/(accessedon9April2017).
19
B.Ho,4TheFutureofASEANCentralityintheAsia-PacificRegionalArchitecture’,YaleJournal
ofInternationalAffairs,2016,Vol.11,pp.80-81.
20
H.ThiTha,4ReconcilingConsensuswithNewRealities’,ASEANFocus,Jan/Feb2017,No.13,pp.4-7.
21
L.Quayle,4Indonesia,theASEANSocio-CulturalCommunity,andthecontingentprofileofregional
“great-powermanagement”’,ThePacificReview,June2017,pp.5-6;E.Aspinall,4OligarchicPopulism:
PrabowoSubianto’sChallengetoIndonesianDemocracy’,Indonesia,April2015,No.99,pp.2-3.
