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16
RobertoRabel,KieranIreland
ofaregionalidentitythaninEurope,withunresolvedterritorialdisputesandhistorical
enmitiescomplicatingmattersfurther.28
Top-downeffortstofosterawarenessofandappreciationforASEANaresimilarly
disjointed.Atoneextreme,Singaporehasengagedinamulti-levelprogrammeof
engagementwithitspopulationtopromoteanASEANidentity,whileattheother,only
one-twentiethofIndonesianssurveyeddemonstratedevenbasicawarenessofASEAN’s
economiccommunity-building.
29
TheconstructionofadistinctlySoutheastAsianidentity
rootedinASEANappearstobeanunevenprojectatbest,withacoherentideaof4Southeast
Asian-ness’remainingadistantprospect.
Ifissuesclosertohomedistractthenationaleliteswhodrivetheirstates’engagement
withASEAN,regionalintegrationwillfalter.Thisisparticularlyimportantwhere
theruleoflawisweakerandsmallgroupsorindividualscandetermineforeignpolicy
unfettered.Malaysia,Thailand,andCambodiaareincreasinglysubjecttothistrend,as
allthreefacetheerosionofdemocraticinstitutions.30Thepastyearorsohasdelivered
severalpressingissuesinrapidsuccession.Thailandremainsengrossedinthemilitary
government’sresponsetothedeathofKingBhumibol,theRohingyacrisishasfurther
complicatedMyanmar’sconsolidationofitstransitiontodemocraticcivilianruleand
thePhilippines,despiteholdingtherotatingASEANpresidencyin2017,hasshownmore
interestindomesticandbilateralrelations.31
Critically,Indonesiahasbeenlesswillingtocommittoregionalleadershipunder
thepresidencyofJokoWidodo,whohas4tendedtoleaveASEANmoretotheForeign
Ministry’.
32
ThereisjustifiableconcernaboutIndonesia’scommitmenttoASEAN:if
theleadersofitsmemberstatesdriveASEAN,theabsenceoftheleaderofitslargest
memberistroubling.
33
Somemakethecounterargumentthat,whileASEANmaydeliverless
foritsmembersthantheEU,thereisnopotentialcandidateforan4X-exit’inthemanner
ofBritain’sexitfromtheEU.UnlikethedividedperspectivesEUmembersholdonits
desirabilityandfunction,ASEAN’smemberscontinuetoviewitsraisond’êtreofpreserving
regionalpeaceandsecurityasfundamentallyvalid.
34
Here,ASEAN’sweaknessbecomes
astrength,astheinabilityoftheSecretariattoimposebindingregulationsuponitsmembers
givesfewerincentivesforresistancetothesupranationalproject.
28
D.Hutt,4HowNationalismUnderminesASEANIntegration’,TheDiplomat,7June2017,http://
thediplomat.com/2017/06/how-nationalism-undermines-asean-integration/(accessedon30July2017).
29
G.C.Tong,op.cit.,p.24;A.Makin,4FearsofanOpenMarket:Citizens’VoicesoftheASEAN
EconomicCommunity(AEC)’,ADDIN,August2016,Vol.10,No.2,p.326.
30
T.Pongsudhirak,4Aseanregionalismandauthoritarianism’,BangkokPost,5August2017,http://
www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1300259/asean-regionalism-amid-authoritarianism(accessedon
9August2017).
31
M.Cook,4SoutheastAsiaOutlook2017’,pp.6-7.
32
L.Quayle,op.cit.,p.2.
33
M.Davies,op.cit.;D.K.Emmerson,4ASEANbetweenChinaandAmerica:IsItTimetoTryHorsing
theCow?’,TRaNS:Trans-Regionaland-NationalStudiesofSoutheastAsia,January2017,Vol.5,No.1,
p.6.
34
T.Chalermpalanupap,op.cit.
