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isineffect.Inthisrespect,PoppertakesanoppositeviewtoFrege,who
stronglycriticizedanytheoryoftruthbasedoncorrespondence.Takinginto
accountA.Grobler(2006),Nowaczyk(1998,2004)andWoleński(2005),it
shouldbesaidthatTarskipresentedtruthintermsofagivenlanguage
andgiveninterpretationwiththeassumptionthateachsentencesignifies
something,i.e.asentencehasonemeaningandthatanymappingofwords
(terms)fromagivenlanguageintowords(terms)ofagivenmetalanguage
preservestheirmeanings.Tarski’sdefinitionoftruthdoesnotdefinethe
contentofthisconcept,butonlyanextensionofitand,asSzymura(1995)
says,thisdefinitionisnotappropriatewithrespecttothetruthfulnessof
scientifictheories.ThoughDescartesandLockeenrichedthenotionoftruth
withtheconceptofcorrespondence,G.Moore,B.RussellandWittgenstein
gaveitastrongercoherence.ForRussell,thecorrespondenceofpropositions
torealityconsistsintheconsistencyofbeliefswithsomeconsideredcom-
plexofrealobjects,andforWittgenstein,correspondencemeansmapping
aproposition’sstructurewithrespecttothestructureoftheobjectthatis
ofconcernintheproposition.Intheauthor’sopinion,definitionsoftruth
usingthismeaningofcorrespondenceshouldbeasubjectofdeepdiscussion
byeconomists.
Despitethefactthateconomicsbasedonfactualcorrespondenceswould
haveastructurethatissocomplexthatitexcludestheconstructionofstruc-
turalmodelsisomorphictothem,theauthorbelievesthatconstructingan
approximatecounterpartofsuchidealmodelsisvaluable,boththeoretically
andpractically.
Logicalempiricistsareconvincedthatinordertodeterminethetruth-
fulnessofsentencesusingempiricalconfirmation,itisnotsufficientjustto
useadditionallogicalcriteria.AsNeurathandHempelstate,thetruthful-
nessofscientificsentences,duetotheirgenerality,meansmorethanthe
truthfulnessfunctionofindividualsentencesandthecoherenceoftheircon-
tents.Forexample,vanFrassenstatesthatthereisnoneedtotalkabout
thetruthortruthfulnessofascientifictheory.Itsufficestocheckwhether
itisacceptable(empiricallyappropriate)onthegroundsofchosencriteria
forthepredictability,explicability,describabilityofrealworldphenomena.
DavidsonandPutnam,inturn,acceptedthethesisthattheoryisnotde-
terminedbyempiricaldata,soaccordingtothem,criteriafortherational
acceptabilityorapproximativetruthofatheoryaresufficient,whichleads
ustosuitablescientificproceduresormethodsacceptedbyalargegroupof
scientificexperts.
Inthisrespect,Popper’sconceptofverisimilitudehasbeenalsointu-
itivelybroadlydiscussedandusedinanalyzingthepropertiesoftheories