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1.Tearchitectureofthebilingualmentallexicon
willnotconsideranumberofprominentmodelswithincognitivelinguisticssuch
asthoseofFodor(1975),Jackendof(1983,1990),andLangacker(1987)because,
duetotheirmonolingualfocus,theydonotsignificantlycontributetodebates
onthecontentsofbilingualminds.Consequently,prioritywillbegiventothose
frameworkswhichencompasslanguage-mediatedcognitiveprocessesandwhose
scopehaseitherbeenextendedtoorisdirectlyapplicabletobilingualcognition.
1.2.1.Featurelistngs
Tediscussionwillstartwithclassicalsemantictheory(Saeed2003)whichposits
thatthepsychologicalconstruct,i.e.concept,developedforaword’sdenotation
constitutesthemeaningoftheword.Suchaconceptisself-definingasitcontains
informationaboutthenecessaryandsufcientconditionsthatsetitapartfrom
otherconceptsandgivegroundsfortheidentificationandcategorizationofentities.
Whatismore,theconceptmustbeautonomousenoughtoallowpeopletodiscuss
itwithoutfirst-handexperienceorknowledgeofwhatitstandsfor.Forinstance,
peopleofenusewordstorefertothingstheyhaveneverseenandknowlittleabout.
Finally,theconceptcontainsbitsofculturalandencyclopaedicknowledge,similar
tothetypeofinformationfoundindictionaries.Aconceptcorrespondingtoasingle
wordistermedalexicalizedconcept.
OneofthepracticesadoptedbyclassicalsemanticsdatesbacktoAristotleand
involvesusingwordsandphrasesasfeaturelabelstospecifyparticularconcepts.For
example,aBANANAcanbecharacterizedasfruit<yellow<long<sweet<mushy
andthelike(Barsalou1993;Kövecses2006).Asimilarlistcouldbedrawnup
todesignatethebanana’snecessaryandsufcientfeaturesforthepurposeof
establishingitscategorymembership.Tenumberofnecessaryfeatures,allof
whichhaveequalstatus,isfixedandsharedbyallthecategorymembers.Sufcient
featuresguaranteecategorymembershipwithoutconstitutingthecategoryitself.
Forinstance,beingamammalisasufcientfeatureforahuman.However,notall
mammalsarehuman.
Steepedintradition,thisviewwaschallengedbythe20th-centuryphilosopher
Wittgenstein(1953),who,onanalysingtheconceptofagame,cametotheconclusion
thatthemembersofaconceptualcategorymayshareveryfewnecessaryfeatures,
perhapsonlyoneortwo.Still,thisisenoughtoimprintonthemacertainfamily
resemblance.Whatalsocametohisnoticewasthatsomecharacteristicsofconcepts
weremorepronouncedandtypicalthanothersandthatconceptsdidnotseem
tohaverigidboundaries(Kövecses2006).1Otherresearchersraisedobjections
1TisnotionisrejectedbyCrofandCruse(2004),whoexplainthattheideaoffuzzinessof
naturalcategoryboundarieswasconceivedonthebasisofsimilarityjudgmentsmadebydiferent
subjectsundervaryingcontextualconditions.Tejudgmentsinvolvedresponsestosinglelexicalized
itemswhichwereofendecontextualized.Whilecategoryboundariesmayvaryfromsituationto