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RobertKupiecki
NATOsecuritypolicy.7ItsauthorssuggestedaninterpretationofNATO
strategythroughtheprismofmilitaryandnon-militarypolicies,pointing
outthattherewasnocontradictionbetweencollectivedefenceanddétente.
Thisreportdidnot,however,includeanyplanstocombinetheAlliance’s
traditionaltaskswiththedevelopmentofnewinstrumentsfordiplomacy,
securityandtensionreductionbetweenthetwoblocs(armscontroland
disarmament).ThedecisionswerethuslefttotheNorthAtlanticCouncil.
AsAndreasWegnerrightlynoted:“ratherthanstickingwiththebilateral
superpowerdétentebasedontheterritorialandnuclearstatusquoinEurope,
theUnitedStatessoughttostrengthenmultilateral(militaryandpolitical)
cooperationandconsultationwithinNATOandsimultaneouslytoengage
theSovietUnionandtheEastEuropeanstatesintalksthatwouldleadto
awiderEuropeandétenteandpromotegradualchangeintheEasternbloc.”8
Thereby,détente,asasourceofdivisionamongtheAllies,becameasubject
ofcontrolbutdidnotleadtotheeasingofstrainedtransatlanticrelations.
DuringthepreparationoftheHarmelReport,aspecialworkinggroup
focusedontheproblemoftransatlanticrelationsandthewaystoimprove
them.9Itsmembers,thoughgratefulforNATO’sachievementsinhaltingthe
expansionofcommunisminEurope,askedmanyquestionsregardingthe
stateofrelationsbetweentheAlliesattheendoftheseconddecadeofthe
Alliance’soperation.10Theresponsesstressedaneedtoenforcecooperation
7
Sub-GroupIII:TheFutureSecurityPolicyoftheAlliance,www.nato.int/archives/harmel/
8
harmel03.htm.
A.Wenger,op.cit.,p.17.
9
Sub-GroupII:Lesrelationsinterallies,www.nato.int/archives/harmel/harmel02.htm.
Itwastheonlyoneofthefourreportsofthesub-groupsworkingwithinthewholeHarmel
projectthatwaspreparedinFrench.
10
TheproblemitselfwasdefinedasapermanentstructuralissueinNATO,resultingfrom
thelackofproportioninthemilitarypotentialoftheU.S.andtheEuropeanAlliesandthe
chasmthatexistedbetweentheTreaty-guaranteedequalityofthemembersandtheactual
differenceintheirinfluenceontheorganisation’scommonmatters.Whilethissituation
wastemporarilyacceptableafter10yearsofNATO’soperations,theEuropeanAlliesdid
notwanttoagreetosuchascaleofimbalance.Thus,twooptionswerepresented:thefirst
one,unreachable,meantcreatingafullpolitical,economicandmilitarybalancebetween
NATO’sEuropeanandNorthAmericancomponents.Thesecondone,whichwaspreferred,
wasmeanttoreducetheexistingdifferencesandincreasetheinfluenceofEuropeanson
Alliancematters.ItwasperceivedthatthepathtoreachthisgoallayinNATO’s“European
identity.”ThisconceptwashereforthefirsttimeofficiallyusedbytheAlliance,even
thoughitwastwodecadeslater,togetherwiththeprogressofEuropeanintegration,thatit
wasacceptedforgood.Thepathtocreatingsuchaformation,thatwouldensureastronger
positioninrelationtotheUnitedStates,wasmeanttoleadtoincreasedeffectivenessof
Europeanpoliciesineconomy,defenceandpolitics.
10
ThePolishQuarterlyofInternationalAffairs,2017,no.4
