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NewProtectionistTendenciesandInclinationtoBilateralismandRegionalism...
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freetradeandownersofscarcefactorswillfavourprotectionism.Tradepolicy
coalitionswillthereforebeorganizedalongfactororclasslines.Ontheother
hand,theRicardo-Vinerassumesthatsomefactorsarestuckintheirpresent
uses;therefore,factorreturnsarenotequalizedthroughoutaregion’seconomy,
butareindustryspecific.Tradepolicycoalitionsshouldformalongthelinesof
exportingversusimport-competingindustries.
Neitherofthesemodelsexplainshowpreferencesovertradepoliciesare
actuallytranslatedintopoliticalaction(Alt,Frieden,Gilligan,Rodrikand
Rogowski,1996).Inadiscussionoftheendogenoustariffliterature,Nelson
(1988)notesthatthemobilitycostsofthespecific-factorsmodelmaybearesult
ofproductivitydifferentials,labourunionactivity,orindividualpreferences
formembershipinagivengeographicalarea,industry,orfirm(i.e.,some
formofsolidarity)(Nelson,1988).Inallofthesecases,onecanderivealink
topreferencesfortariffpolicy,“butwithoutadditionalinformationonwhy
thespecific-factormodelischosen,itdoesnottellusmuchaboutpolitical
organisation”.
Altetal.(1996)suggestthatonecanbegintounderstandthisprocessby
assumingthatrationalindividualsmakecost/benefitcalculations(Alt,Frieden,
Gilligan,RodrikandRogowski,1996).TheHeckscher-OhlinandRicardo-Viner
modelstellusthebenefitsthatindividualshopetoreceive,butthecostsof
collectiveactionalsointerveneastheyorganizetoachievethosebenefitsinthe
politicalsystem.Olson(1985)arguedthatsmallgroupswithspecializedinterests
areeasiertoorganizeandmoreeffectiveinsecuringeconomicrentsthanlarge
groupswithdiffuseinterests(Olson,1985).Smallgroupsarebetterableto
controlfreeridersthanlargegroups,andgroupswithspecificorhomogenous
interestscanmoreeasilycoordinateandtargettheiractivitiesthangroupswith
diffuseorheterogeneousinterests.Thisapproachisthoughttoexplainthe
successofagriculturalproducergroupsindevelopedcountriesinorganizing
forprotectionaswellastheinabilityofagriculturalproducergrouptoorganize
indevelopingcountries(Anderson,1995;Coleman,1998;Olson,1985;Olson,
1986;Sheingate,2001).
However,Nelson(1988)pointsoutthatweshouldnotassumethatorganized
interestswillbeequallyresponsivetoallissues(Nelson,1988).Institutionalized
interactionamongactorsmayhelptoexplainsystematicpatternsofaction,
especiallyasinstitutionscreatedforspecifichistoricalpurposesmayoutlivethose
purposes.Altetal.(1996)suggestthatifaparticulargrouphaspaidthefixed
costsofestablishingcollectiveactionanddevelopedwell-wornchannelsofaccess
topublicofficials,itmaydefenditstradepolicypreferencesevenwhenthestakes
arelowbecausethemarginalcostsofactionarelow(Alt,Frieden,Gilligan,
RodrikandRogowski,1996).Itmaybethecasethat“amuchmoreaffected
butinchoategroupdoesnothingbecausethestart-upcostsoforganizationare
