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CHAPTERI
toodaunting”.Paststrengthofanorganizationshouldthereforebeanimportant
interveningvariablepredictinggroupactionontradepolicy.Further,asNelson
(1988)argues,oncetheseinstitutionsexist,supply-sideinterventionsmayalso
affecttheirusefulnessassomearedeemedlegitimateorillegitimateaggregators
ofinterest(Nelson,1988).Thus,wemustexaminethewayinwhicheconomic
institutionsandpoliticalinstitutionsinteract.Mosteconomicmodelssimplyassume
thatamodeloftheeconomyisamodelofthedemandsidefortradepolicy,but
Nelson(1988)suggeststhatwemustelaboratethemechanismbywhichdemand
isarticulatedtothesuppliersoftradepolicy(Nelson,1988).Foragoodoverview
ofthisargument,especiallyasitpertainstoagriculture(ThiesandPorche,2007).
Ifthepoliticalsystemsrewardssmallsectoralgroups,thanindividualswill
notpaythecostsoforganizinglargeintersectoralcoalitions.Ifthepolitical
systemrewardslargemassmovements(i.e.,majoritarianism),thanindividuals
willhavetopaythecostsoforganizinglargeintersectoralcoalitionsinorder
toachieveanybenefits.Collectiveactioncostsandpoliticalinstitutionsare
interactivewithfactorspecify.TheysuggestthatRogowski’s(1989)Heckscher-
Ohlinframeworkrequireslowfactorspecify,lowcollectiveactioncosts,and
domesticpoliticalinstitutionsthatfavourmassmovements(Rogowski,1989).
TheRicardo-Vinerframeworkusedbytheendogenoustariffliteraturerequires
thatfactorsarespecific,collectionactioncostsarehigh,andinstitutionsare
lessmajoritarian,withchangesinanyofthesethreevariablesalsoaffecting
thetypeofcoalitionsthatform.
Inthestateasarationaldictatormodel,thestatemaybeseenaseither
pursuing“goodgovernment”goalsalongasocialwelfarefunctionorintervening
intheeconomyfortheirownself-interestedmodelofthestateviewspoliticians
asofferingpreferentialtradepolicytoeconomicactorsinexchangeforpolitical
support(Magee,Brock,Young,1989),(GrossmanandHelpman,1984).Onthe
otherhand,pluralisttheorytypicallyviewthestateasaneutralaggregatorof
demandsfromgroupsinsociety.Thesupplyoftradepolicyisthendetermined
bythebalanceofpoweronanygivenissue.Thesupplysideoftradepolicy
isrelativelyundevelopedtheoretically,andyetacrucialpartoftheequation.
Avarietyofdifferentcharacteristicsofthepoliticalsystemarepositedtoaffect
thesupplyoftradeprotectionism,suchaspoliticiansincentivestocultivate
personalvotes,thesizeofelectoraldistricts,partyfragmentation,federalism,
presidentialversusparliamentarysystems,andsoon(Nielson,2003;Rodrik,
1995;Rogowski,1987;Rogowski,1987).
Onatheoreticallevel,understandingthechoiceoftradepoliciesincountries
isveryimportant.Asurveyofeconomistsin1984suggestedthatoneofthe
fewthingstheyagreedonwasthat,undermostconditions,tariffs,andquotas
reducethegeneralwelfare(Frey,1984).Thestubbornnessofprotectionismin
thefaceofinternationalandacademicpressureagainstithasledeconomists
