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MagdalenaGóra,KatarzynaZielińska
Theexternalincentivemodelisbasedonthesetofconditionsdevelopedbythe
EUandafterwardsenforcedwithastickandcarrotmechanismonthecandidate
countries.TheimportantmechanismoftheprocessofEuropeanisationinthecontext
ofenlargementisthepolicyofconditionalitydevelopedbytheEUtoassistthecan-
didatecountries.Itscoreelementisthat"[t]heEUprovidestheincentiveofmember-
shipasaconditionalrewardforadoptingandcomplyingwithitsrules.Governments
calculatewhetherthebenefitsofmembershipoutweighthedomesticcoststhatarise
fromadoptingtheEU’srules”(BörzelandSedelmeier2006:66).Thisstreamof
researchfollowingthemodelstressesthattheprocessofchangeondomesticlevel
–besidetheobviouslong-termbenefits–didnothappeninthepoliticalvacuumbut
rather,onthecontrary,itcostslocalpoliticalelitesalot.Thepoliticalconditional-
ityhypothesisisconnectedwiththegeneralsystemicchangeandstressesthat"the
levelofdemocracyintheneighbouringcountriesoftheEUincreaseswiththesize
andthecredibilityoftheEU’sconditionalincentive”(SchimmelfennigandScholtz
2008:190).Theefficiencyofconditionalitydependsonmanyvariables,amongoth-
ersthelevelofdomesticpoliticalcostorthecredibilityofthepromisesgiventothe
candidatecountry(SchimmelfennigandSedelmeier2005).Domesticchangeinthe
generalframeworkofEuropeanintegrationdependsonsuchindicatorsasthesizeof
acountry,pre-existingpoliciesandhowfarthecountry’sdomesticpolicyrequiresad-
aptation;thepoliticalprocessinwhichpoliciesareembeddedandwhichdetermines
thescopeandspeedofachange;reformcapacityofthestate;domesticpolitical
costs,andfinallydiscourse(SchmidtandRadaelli2004).KarenSmithclearlystates:
Theuseofpoliticalconditionalityisparticularlycontentious:whilesomegovernments
andpoliticalactivistsappreciatethesupportitgivesreformers,othersresentitasanim-
positionofforeignvalues.Thecriticsareaidedbytheinconsistentuseofconditionality
–whichopenstheEUtochargesthatitimposesconditionalityonlywhenitsinterestsare
notadverselyaffected(2004:157).
HeatherGrabbedevelopedacatalogueofmechanismsusedbytheEUtoeffect
changethroughconditionality.Shestressestheprocessofgate-keepingallowingthe
EUtocontrolaccesstonegotiationsandfurtherstagesintheaccessionprocessand
pressurethegovernmentstoimposedesireddecisions.Thesecondtypeisbench-
markingandmonitoring,whichreliesontheestablishingofcertainstandardsand
afterwardsscrupulousandregularassessmentofprogress.TheEUdeliveredmodels
forthedesiredchanges,whichtooktheformofprovisionsoflegislativeandinstitu-
tionaltemplates.Theimportantmechanismswerefinancialincentivesintheformof
aidandtechnicalassistance,andfinallyadviceandtwinning(2001:10–21).
However,theEUaccessionnegotiationswerehardlytheonlysourceofchanges.
Somescholarscoinedanadaptation-by-anticipationthesis.Thisapproachstressed
thattheanticipatedmembershiphasbecomeapowerfulincentiveitselfforstate
modernisationandthereformoftheCEEcountrieswithoutstatingacleartemplate
tofollow.Theconceptofthelogicofappropriatenessservingasajustificationfor
politicalactionsisusefulinexplainingthisphenomenon(Sjursen2006;Olsen2008).
AsJohanP.Olsenwrites: