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Ukraine.Asinglevoiceofoppositionwouldhavedeprived
RussiaofitsvetopowerattheSecurityCouncil,anditreally
stretchestheimaginationtothinkthatUkrainecouldhave
acceptedtheRussianrequestifhadbeenpressedwith
Russia’sterritorialclaims.Anditshouldbekeptinmindthat
RussiaisjustoneofthelegalsuccessorsoftheSovietUnion,
alongwithotherstatesthatemergedafterthelatter’s
breakup.
Thus,followingtheendoftheColdWar,theconditionfor
recognisingRussiaasinheritingtheUSSR’ssuperpower
statuswasthatRussiashouldpursuepeacefulpolicies,have
noterritorialclaimsagainstneighbours,andrenounce
annexation,ortheuseofforceorthreatstothateffect,
asapolicyinstrument.Fromthispointofview,whenRussia
signeduptotheBudapestMemorandum9–guaranteeing
Ukraine’sterritorialintegrityandfreedomfromRussian
military,politicalandeconomicpressuresinexchangefor
theUkrainiannucleararsenalsbeingturnedovertoRussia–
itonlyconfirmedthecommitmentsRussiamadepreviously
byvirtueofitsmembershipoftheUNandtheOSCE,and
asacountryboundbythe1990ParisCharter.
ThuscallsmadelatelyinRussiaforanentirelynew
securitysystem,whichwouldreflectCrimea’sbeingapart
ofthatcountry,10couldwellbecomparedtoahypothetical
situationinwhicha“roadhog”unwillingtocomplywith
thespeedlimitsdecreedintheHighwayCodearguesthat
codeinitsentiretyisfailingtofunction,withworktherefore
needingtobeginimmediatelyonthewritingofanewcode.
Thechancesofsuccessareverymuchsimilarinthecases
ofbothrequests.
Verysoon,anybusinessoperationinCrimeawill
bedoomedtobecomeverynarrowlyspecialised,and
confinedtotheterritoryofthePeninsula.Crimeawill
bedepopulatingfast,withsomeinhabitantsheadingfor
Russia,othersforUkraine.Theonlydevelopmentoptionfor
thePeninsulaavailabletotheKremlinwillbefurther
militarisation.ButtheoccupationofCrimeawilllimit
Russia’sroomformanoeuvreinforeignpolicy,blocking
prospectsforbetterrelationswithglobalheavyweights,
orfortheremovaloftradeandvisabarriers.Itwillalsokill
chancesforEuro-Asianintegration,asBelarusand